The Seven Sins of Evolutionary Psychology - Konrad Lorenz Institute

Carlos Stegmanntive mechanisms. Most special-purpose mechanismsin the brain, of which there are many in subcorticalregions, evolved long before humans emerged ascontenders for the top ‘predator’ position in thefeeding hierarchy.”On p122: “The existence of various emotional andmotivational feelings, along with general-purposelearning systems, can provide practically all thetypes of adaptive behavioral strategies that havebeen discussed by evolutionary psychologists.”And on p125: “In our estimation, the type of psychologicalfunctions that evolutionary psychologistsspeak of, arise largely from the utilization ofvery old emotional capacities working in concertwith newly evolved inductive abilities supported bythe vast general-purpose neocortical associationareas.”I fully agree with all those statements. But if the‘modular’ explanation of evolutionary psychology isnot accepted, what other explanation can be proposed?What the paper proposes is a general approach,but it does not suggest a possible concreteexplanation that would substitute for the ‘modules’of evolutionary psychology. As I said at the beginning,a more thorough explanation can only arisefrom a comprehensive interdisciplinary approach,in which all the strata of the integrated natural entityHomo sapiens are considered. The main concepts,which govern such an interdisciplinary approach,may be put as follows:The phylogenetic evolution which culminatedwith the appearance of homo sapiens must haveincluded several instances of the phenomenon‘fulguration’ (LORENZ 1973, 1978), whereby,through the combination of various elements, anew category of existence comes into being, theproperties of which could not have been predictedfrom the properties of the composing elements.The new entity now possesses a new upper stratum,but it is still the integrated whole of all the stratathat compose it, from the atomic-molecular to thespiritual. Certain natural laws act in every stratum,and explanations or reductions must be consideredpossible. The new species is distinguished, chiefly,by the possession of a new cognitive apparatus. Thisapparatus operates with two different mechanismsor processes:1. The mechanism or process of objective cognition,usually called reason, which contains the analyticfaculties which permit to derive synthetic knowledgeabout reality (CARNAP 1995), combined withthe faculty of language and a greatly expandedmemory, and which superseded (but still includes),as a result of the fulguration, the ratiomorphfaculties of the pre-human ancestor;2. The mechanism or process of moral cognition,usually called conscience, which relates objectivelyknown options for action to, also objectivelyknown, values, which in turn are related to certainfeelings which the apparatus generates to make usact (DAMASIO 1994), and which superseded (butstill includes), as a result of the fulguration, theaction-governing instincts of the pre-human ancestor.This agrees with the following statement of thecommented paper (p116):“…the classic distinction between emotional andcognitive processes is sustained by abundant dataindicating that the two can be dissociated functionallyand anatomically…”.At the behavioral psychological level, human decisionmaking is based on beliefs. In objective cognition,a belief is the conviction of the truth of a statement,that is, of the correspondence of the statementwith the objective fact that it intends to describe.The objective fact may refer either to the propertiesof an object, as in scientific discovery, but also, e.g.,in engineering design, in business administration,and in many other practical fields, to the objectivemeans and ways to attain a purpose, in a range thatextends from the many everyday decisions for actionwe take on the spur of a moment, to the elaborateplans based on PERT or CPM methods in largeenterprises. In moral cognition, a belief is the convictionof the rightness of instrumental and end values,i.e., moral general norms of conduct, and institutions,which apply generally to all, like democracyor socialism. These moral convictions constitute ageneral framework for our decisions for action.A belief is actually the feeling of the emotionswhich govern our decisions for action, and which,as said in the commented paper, “arise largely fromthe utilization of very old emotional capacities” inthe ancient subcortical structures of the brain, andis attached, or affixed, to objectively known conceptsin “the vast general-purpose neocortical associationareas”.In objective cognition a scientist is convinced ofthe truth of his or her theory, and an executive of thecorrectness of his or her approach to a practical problem.However, although both hold on firmly to theirbeliefs, they will change them if well-argued fundamentalcriticism makes this necessary. Thus, evolutionarypsychologists may change the approach totheir subject as a result of the PANKSEPP’s critical observations,or an engineer his manual methods forEvolution and Cognition ❘ 22 ❘ 2001, Vol. 7, No. 1