The Seven Sins of Evolutionary Psychology - Konrad Lorenz Institute

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Jaak Panksepp and Jules B. Panksepptivational survival concerns (PANKSEPP 1988, 1989).We anticipate that those ‘spheres of influence’ mayprocess information in unique ways. We also believethat the frontal lobes have some very general abilitiesthat give it such a unique role in elaboratingvarious executive processes (GALLESE/GOLDMAN1998; BARKLEY 2001). Indeed, many such executiveprocesses probably participate in so many differentcognitive functions that the concept of modularitymerely becomes a hinderance in trying to work outhow some of the basic cortical processes that helpconstruct so many sophisticated cognitive abilitiesvia the experiences of individuals.Thus, we are not adverse to studying such higherfaculties, but we suggest that evolutionary viewshave not and are not likely to have any impact onhow we empirically study these functions, althoughthey can help loosen up the types of intellectual constipationthat have characterized past variants ofwhat might be appropriately called ‘dustbowl cognitivism’(see BARKLEY 2001 for an example of this laxativeexperience). In any event, our position was thatultimately, most of the sophistication of the corticalfunctions is brought to life experientially. An understandingof the neuro-maturational processes thatyield well-honed cortical processes will be much,much more, dependent on general brain mechanismsthat govern neuronal plasticity than any typeof resolved information that is contained in thegenes. That was our main point, and we encounterednothing in ATRAN’s well-crafted defense that dissuadesus from this position.We see our disagreement amounting to littlemore than a matter of emphasis. ATRAN wishes toretain the concept of modularity and sees some typeof implicit advantage in that evolutionary view, althoughhe does not suggest how it might be cashedout empirically. We see both of those issues to besuperfluous for the pursuit of his faculty-psychologyprogram. We regret that he fails to see the potentialpower of subcortical, socio–emotional systems ingoverning many of the processes in which he is interested.Thus, to take his first example of a structuralprinciple, ‘the whole–object constraint’, theunderstanding of which modularity has presumablyfacilitated, we point out that the visual systemis certainly designed during early development toperceive the objects of the world (this is also evidentin other animals). In our estimation, young childrenattach labels to such objects using social, ‘point andname’ games with caretakers. To underestimate basicsocial/motivational/emotional processes in suchlinguistic acquisitions is, we think, shortsighted.Considering that ATRAN dealt with only one smallsegment of our critique, we were surprised that heclaimed that “there is no empirical evidence whateverto indicate” that our “central thesis is true, andmuch to suggest that it is false”. If the ‘seven solutions’we shared are of relevance for human behavior(admittedly most remain to be tested in humans),then a cognitive psychology that continues to neglectsuch issues must surely be deemed nothingshort of myopic. We think that the failure of mostcommentators to deal with the animal data we providedsimply highlights that a great deal of the evolutionaryprocesses that control our behavior appearto be of little interest to evolutionary and cognitivepsychologists. We suspect that many of those processesare absolutely essential for the higher processesin which cognitive scientists are so interestedand we will only note the disastrous effects that damageto those subcortical systems can have on humanmental life (DAMASIO 1999; SCHIFF/PLUM 1999).As we stated in the target article, while socializationis certainly not a direct evolutionary explanationof human language (as ATRAN also emphasizes),it probably was a selective force for the emergence ofcommunicative intent. We assume that all will agreethat relatively little human language would emergewithout socialization. We can also agree, that inmost people when they have learned language, agreat deal of the critical circuitry is concentrated inWERNICKE’s and BROCA’s areas of the left hemisphere,as well as the circuits of the anterior cingulate. Moreover,if all those tissues are destroyed, the child willstill learn language by using, presumably, the correspondingsystems of the right hemisphere (BATRO2000 VARGHA-KHADEM et al. 1997). However, the plotnow thickens. Children born deaf also aspire to communicateand they do quite successfully, partly byusing somewhat different parts of the brain wheresomatosensory skills are usually elaborated (NEVILLEet al. 1998; PASQUAL-LEONE/TORRES 1993). And wheredo multiply impaired individuals like Hellen KELLERelaborate their urge to communicate?We, along with others (LIEBERMAN 2000), believethat so much of language is linked to subcortical andcortico–limbic social urges/pragmatics, that it may bethat language emerged from these ingrained systemsinteracting with our massively sophisticated RAMtypespace of the neocortex. The reason the left hemispherehas such primacy in most people is becausethe left side of the brain is more talented at extrovertedsocial activities (for reasons we will not entertainhere), and because WERNICKE’s area is nestled betweenall of the major perceptual surfaces of the brainEvolution and Cognition ❘ 70 ❘ 2001, Vol. 7, No. 1
A Continuing Critique of Evolutionary Psychologythat harvest exteroceptive information (i.e. vision,hearing and touch). The ultimate function of languageis to symbolize the world in abstractions andto allow us to develop better internal thought for thepursuit of our many basic goals and externalizedstrategies for coordinating group activities.Thus, we are able to buffer information about ourrole in the world in much more complex ways thanany other species, but where is the intrinsic, evolutionarily-selected‘module’? How could genetic selectionhave created such dispositions uniquely forthe human mind/brain? Where are the genes for language?Might all the pragmatics have already beenthere before humanoids walked the face of the earth?Might the main thing we needed to cross the syntactic-culturalRubicon have been a massive endowmentof more RAM-type space in the right parts ofthe brain working within the context of the mountingmedium of cultural evolution?In saying all of this, we must again emphasize thatwe certainly agree that there are many specializedfunctions in the adult human cortex. In our originalarticle, we did not aspire to suggest that there werenone. Not for a moment do we believe that higherfaculties are constructed merely from associativenetworks. We think that the cortex has many specialways to construct meaning (BARKLEY 2001). There areintrinsic mirroring processes (RIZZOLATTI/FADIGA/GALLESE/FOGASSI 1996), which may serve as a majorvector in the acquisition of language (GALLESE/GOLD-MAN 1998). However, we suggest, along with someothers (LIEBERMAN 2000), that the cortex could donone of that—simply none of that—without thesupport of subcortical systems (and that seems to bea novel perspective for many). We remain perplexedwhy so many scholars are willing to commit themselvesto neurologically unrealistic images of humannature, such as the neurobiological and corticalmodularities of evolutionary psychology, which arenot yet supported by essentially any sociobiologicaldata. Our main goal was to interject a much greaternote of necessary doubt into the intellectual activitiesof recent variants of Evolutionary Psychology.We disagree deeply with the ‘separatist’ cortico–cognitivist position advanced by ATRAN. The importanceof subcortical and limbic systems in humanaffairs has been massively underestimated. When hesays “nothing from work on subcortical emotions…has provided, or hints at providing, the slightest insightinto the cognitive structures and processes discoveredso far”, we suggest this view simply reflectsa dismissive mode of inquiry preferred by many intellectualsinterested in the higher human proclivitiesand abilities. The subcortical perspective willprovide a great deal once individuals begin to studywhy human minds dwell obsessively on certainthemes when they are hungry, thirsty, cold, sexuallyeager, craving drugs and worrying about their socialattachment concerns. There are bound to be higher‘centers of gravity’ for the cognitive elaboration ofsuch basic functions (PANKSEPP 1988, 1989), perhapsepigenticially magnified or diminished dependingon early experiences (PANKSEPP 2001a). The wholefield of biological psychiatry has been based largelyon manipulating subcortical systems, many ofwhich directly modulate cortical functions. Therewill be a vast new biological–psychiatry revolutionof even greater magnitude when we learn to manipulateother peptide systems in the subcorticalreaches of the brain, especially those that controlspecific emotional and motivational processes(PANKSEPP 1993; 1998a). These molecules will take usto the appetitive core of our existence. We will derivewhole new layers of deep understanding about theemotional imbalances that are called psychopathologies.Animal models will help us work out many ofthe essential neural details of such imbalances, andthereby the sources of our everyday likes and dislikesthat continue to be among the most robust sourcesof personality variability, as well as the basis of somany of our human interactions.There is an ‘affect logic’ to our cognitive activitiesthat has barely been studied empirically (SHAND1920; WIMMER/CIOMPI 1995). We intentionally leftout one phrase (i.e., ‘or neocortical principles of generalassociation’) in the above quote because we arenot as committed to a fully associative mode of corticalprocessing as some of our commentatorswished to impute to us. One can have general-purposelearning functions in the brain which are notsimply based on association-network heuristics(FREEMAN 1999). Aside from a few well-analyzed sensory/perceptualand motor processes, our knowledgeof how the ‘great intermediate net’ of heteromodalcortical tissue operates remains a great mystery. Weare tempted to add that essentially nothing from workof Evolutionary Psychology has provided or hints at providing,lasting insight into the cortico–cognitive structuresand processes that truly exist in the human brain.Still, the evolutionary view can certainly help generatesuch hypotheses (e.g., BARKLEY 2001). If we coulddrop our destructive species-centrism (which nocommentator denied being a problem), we can learnan enormous amount about how the human mind/brain operates (DE WAAL 2001; GALLISTEL/GIBBON2001; PANKSEPP 1998a).Evolution and Cognition ❘ 71 ❘ 2001, Vol. 7, No. 1
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ContentsEvolutionary Psychology: An
Page 3 and 4:
A Synopsis of “The Sevens Sins of
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A Synopsis of “The Sevens Sins of
Page 7 and 8:
Minding the Brainon the basis of re
Page 9 and 10:
Minding the Brainamong bona fide et
Page 11 and 12:
Minding the Brainin their language
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Minding the BrainReferencesBateson,
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“La plus ça change…”simple c
Page 18 and 19:
Linda MealeyReferencesAlcock, J. (1
Page 20 and 21: Carlos StegmannComments on Jaak Pan
Page 22 and 23: Carlos Stegmanntive mechanisms. Mos
Page 24 and 25: Carlos StegmannReferencesCarnap, R.
Page 26 and 27: Russell Gardner, Jr.these subcortic
Page 28 and 29: Russell Gardner, Jr.The enormous sw
Page 30 and 31: Russell Gardner, Jr.ReferencesBakke
Page 32 and 33: Gerhard Meisenbergmodular systems a
Page 34 and 35: Gerhard Meisenbergstraight into the
Page 36 and 37: Gerhard Meisenbergcan assume new fu
Page 38 and 39: Gerhard MeisenbergNishimura, H./Has
Page 40 and 41: Ian Pitchfordother biological resou
Page 42 and 43: Ian Pitchfordappreciation that the
Page 44 and 45: Ian Pitchfordin developmental psych
Page 46 and 47: Scott AtranThe Case for Modularity:
Page 48 and 49: Scott Atranvant domain. For example
Page 50 and 51: Scott Atranpalm lines. From the fac
Page 52 and 53: Scott Atrangroups of species: snake
Page 54 and 55: Scott AtranLittle by little, biolog
Page 56 and 57: Jaak Panksepp and Jules B. Panksepp
Page 82 and 83: Shulamith Kreitlertion—he said on
Page 84 and 85: Shulamith Kreitlercognitive process
Page 86 and 87: Shulamith KreitlerBeliefs about Sel
Page 88 and 89: Shulamith KreitlerInterpersonally-s
Page 90 and 91: Shulamith Kreitlercreased complexit
Page 92 and 93: Shulamith Kreitlerof plasticity. At
Page 94 and 95: Shulamith Kreitlerdevelopmental lev
Page 96 and 97: Shulamith KreitlerKreitler, S./Chem
Page 98 and 99: Chris MacDonaldEvolutionary EthicsV
Page 100 and 101: Chris MacDonaldand… the goods of
Page 102 and 103: Chris MacDonaldMexyzYoux y z0 1 30
Page 104 and 105: Chris MacDonaldmore generally) come
Page 106 and 107: Zusammenfassungen der Artikelin deu
Page 108 and 109: Zusammenfassungen der Artikel in de
Page 110 and 111: Zusammenfassungen der Artikel in de
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