fieldston american reader volume i – fall 2007 - Ethical Culture ...

against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time topreserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is thenthe great object to which our inquiries are directed...By what means is this object attainable? Either the existence ofthe same passion or interest in a majority at the same time mustbe prevented, or the majority, having such coexistent passion orinterest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation,unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression...From this view of the subject it may be concluded that apure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of asmall number of citizens, who assemble and administer thegovernment in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefsof faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost everycase, be felt by the majority of the whole; a communication andconcert results from the form of government itself, and thereis nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weakerparty... Hence it is that such democracies have ever beenspectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been foundincompatible with personal security or the rights of property;and have been in general short in their lives as they have beenviolent in their deaths...A republic, by which I mean a government in which the schemeof representation takes place, opens a different prospect andpromises the cure for which we are seeking...The two great points of difference between a democracy anda republic are: first, the delegation of the government in thelatter to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly,the greater number of citizens and greater sphere of countryover which the latter may be extended.The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refineand enlarge the public views by passing them through themedium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may bestdiscern the true interest of their country and whose patriotismand love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporaryor partial considerations. Under such a regulation it may wellhappen that the public voice, pronounced by the representativesof the people, will be more consonant to the public good than ifpronounced by the people themselves... The question resultingis, whether small or extensive republics are most favorable tothe election of proper guardians of the public weal; it is clearlydecided in favor of the latter...It must be confessed that... By enlarging too much the numberof electors, you render the representative too little acquaintedwith the all their local circumstances and lesser interests; byreducing it too much,you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit tocomprehend and pursue great and national objects. The federalConstitution forms a happy combination in this respect; thegreat and aggregate interests being referred to the national, thelocal and particular to the State legislatures.The other point of difference is the greater number of citizensand extent of territory which may be brought within thecompass of republican than of democratic government; and itis this circumstance which renders factious combinations tobe less dreaded in the former than in the latter. The smallerthe society, the fewer probably will be the distinct partiesand interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties andinterests, the more frequently will a majority be found of thesame party; and the smaller number of individuals composinga majority, and the smaller the compass within which theyare placed, the more easily will they concert and execute theirplans of oppression. Extend the sphere and you take in a greatervariety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that amajority of the whole will have a common motive to invade therights of the other citizens; or, if such a common motive exists,it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their ownstrength and act in unison with each other...The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame withintheir particular States but will be unable to spread a generalconflagration through the other States. A religious sect maydegenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy;but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it mustsecure the national councils against any danger from thatsource. A rage of paper money, for an abolition of debts, foran equal division of property, or any other improper or wickedproject, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Unionthan a particular member of it, in the same proportion thatsuch a malady is more likely to taint a particular county ordistrict than an entire State...[T]herefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseasesmost incident to republican government. And according tothis degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being republicansought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting thecharacter of federalists.PUBLIUS[A]s each representative will be chosen by a greater number ofcitizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be moredifficult for unworthy candidates to practise with success...172 fieldston american reader volume i – fall 2007