Brittle Power- PARTS 1-3 (+Notes) - Natural Capitalism Solutions

90Disasters Waiting to Happenterminals, and regasification plants.This actually happened in 1980–81. Algeria—the major LNG exporter, andthe sole source of LNG exports to the U.S. during 1979–80—abruptly demandedthat its LNG be priced at the energy equivalent of OPEC oil, more than atrebling of earlier prices. The U.S. government, which had just negotiated amuch lower gas price with Canada and Mexico, rejected the Algerian demand.On 1 April 1980, Algeria cut off LNG deliveries to the El Paso Natural GasCompany, idling its costly tankers and its terminals at Cove Point, Marylandand Elba Island, Georgia. A third of the Algerian shipments continued toarrive—via the older (1968–71) Distrigas operation in Everett, Massachusetts,which uses an oil-linked pricing structure and Algerian-owned ships. But by late1981, the Cove Point and Elba Island facilities were still sitting as hostages toprice agreement with Algeria. (So was a nearly completed terminal at LakeCharles, Louisiana.) Algeria has somewhat moderated its initial demands, butit and other LNG exporters still intend to move rapidly to oil parity. Partly forthis reason, the proposed Point Conception (California) LNG terminal seemsunlikely to be built. Argentina, which has never exported LNG, now proposesto build a liquefaction plant to ship over eight hundred million dollars’ worth ofLNG per year to the idle Cove Point and Elba Island plants, but market conditionsseem most unfavorable for this project. Acknowledging the bleak economicoutlook, El Paso in February 1981 “wrote off most of the equity ($365.4million) in its six tankers which hauled Algerian LNG to the East Coast” 17 —asizable loss even for such a large company. Of course the tankers might berevived under some new price agreement; but the investors would then have noguarantee that history would not simply repeat itself. Their massive investmentwould continue to hold them hostage to demands for higher prices.The economic difficulties of LNG arise not only in the international marketplacebut also in the domestic one. New, and probably existing, LNG importscannot compete with domestic gas (let alone with efficiency improvements andsome renewable options). Recent drilling has vastly expanded the reserves of relativelycheap domestic natural gas. Recent geological evidence suggests thatenormous reserves can be tapped at prices well below that of imported LNG.LNG has so far been saleable only by “rolling in” its high price with very cheap(regulated) domestic gas, so that customers see only an average of the two. Gasderegulation will probably increase domestic supply and reduce domesticdemand so much further as to squeeze LNG out of the market entirely.Despite these uncertainties, some LNG is now being imported into theU.S., and facilities are available for more. Even though the present imports areonly about a thousandth of all U.S. natural gas supplies, they represent a disturbingvulnerability: not so much in interrupted energy supply as in the dam-