Brittle Power- PARTS 1-3 (+Notes) - Natural Capitalism Solutions

132Disasters Waiting to Happenbeing bombed every twelve days. Since 1979, the campaign has greatly slackened:the number of utility bombings fell to thirteen in 1979 and eight in 1980,with utilities’ share of total bombings falling to six-tenths of one percent by1980. But eight utility bombings a year still represent a level of violence thatcan do a great deal of damage. Some bombing campaigns, such as the Oregonseries in 1974, have posed such a threat to public safety that the governmenthad to institute a massive manhunt, install standby power sources, call forpower curtailments, and even consider calling up the National Guard. 62Hard-to-trace disruption can be caused simply by using a substation’s controlswithout damaging them. (A novel describes a fictional extortionist whocaused blackouts in New York City by throwing under-street transformerswitches. 63 ) Con Ed’s Indian Point substation even caused a blackout on 19July 1977 when it blew up all by itself. A similar incident on 12 July 1981—one of three Con Ed substation fires in five days—blacked out thirty-nine thousandcustomers. 64 A recent failure at a single sixty-nine-kilovolt transformerblew it up, ignited three thousand gallons of cooling oil, and halted the supplyvia thirteen underground cables to substations. Thus a single failureblacked out for four hours six percent of Con Ed’s load—much of lowerManhattan, including one of the world’s densest concentrations of financialcomputers. 65 Substations are so vulnerable that they have been shut down byas little as an inquisitive squirrel. 66To the end user, it matters little whether a power interruption is in the bulksupply—which accounts for only about fifteen percent of all blackouts—or indistribution (which accounts for the rest). 67 For local or selective disruption,sabotage of distribution is at least as easy to arrange as sabotage of transmissionlines or high-voltage switching stations, and it can be just as hard torepair. Attacks on local distribution equipment cannot, of course, affect asmany customers, and are much less likely to affect the stability of the entiregrid. But they are more certain to black out particular local areas because fordistribution, unlike transmission, alternative pathways are often not availableunless the utility has mobile equipment for temporary connections.Control and communicationsThe ability of power grids to function at all, let alone to reroute power arounddamaged equipment, assumes the operability of most control systems. 68 Controlcenters must communicate with each other and with field equipment (generators,switches, relays, etc.); otherwise no rerouting or load alterations are possible.This communication relies on telex, telephone, signals sent over the powerlines themselves, radio, and private microwave circuits. Despite battery and