Brittle Power- PARTS 1-3 (+Notes) - Natural Capitalism Solutions

78Brittle Powerthere is a threat to the health of the public, and national security is involved ifsomeone gets in there to hold the plant hostage for whatever reason.” 81A U.S. Marshals Service review of reactor guard forces in 1975 found theyhad weak allegiance, high turnover rate, poor background checks and supervision,inferior equipment, weak legal authority, poor rapport with localpolice, poor mobility, no uniform physical fitness standards, low public confidence,and little training. 82 Many of these weaknesses persist today. 83 Elevenguards at the Trojan nuclear plant were even charged in 1980 with bulk salesof various illegal drugs. At many plants during 1980–81, guards were reportedto be drunk on the job. 84 The pre-employment background of guards hasbeen a particularly sore point since a convicted and paroled armed robber gota job as a security guard under an alias at the former Kerr McGee plutoniumfuel fabrication plant in Oklahoma. He was found out and fired in 1974, thensix months later arrested in connection with an attempted bank robbery inwhich a woman was shot. 85Even with honest guards, breaches of security are fairly common. A womanworking at Browns Ferry forgot she had a pistol in her purse and carried itthrough a guardpost undetected in February 1980. 86 General AccountingOffice auditors in 1977 “were able to pick the locks and open several doors tovital areas of [a nuclear power] plant by using a screwdriver or a piece ofwire...found on the ground near the door.” 87 Other breaches of security toonumerous to mention have elicited Nuclear Regulatory Commission fines ofutilities on almost a monthly basis. A Phoenix Arizona security consultant tonuclear utilities has stated that at the peak of a nuclear plant’s security, he hasyet to observe one that he can’t break into undetected. 88 For the convenienceof intruders who do not want to rely only on the laxity or corruptibility ofsecurity guards, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission thoughtfully publishesmany detailed plans and analyses of nuclear plants’ security systems, includinga computer program for determining terrorists’ most promising modes of entryand attack, and a technical survey of the best ways to break through thirty-twokinds of fences and barriers used at nuclear plants. 89Nuclear plants are arguably the fattest target for terrorists, and the onlymajor class of energy facilities whose security is supposedly enforced by stringentgovernment regulation. The discouraging picture of security at nuclearplants, then, hardly gives one confidence that other, and in many respectsmore vulnerable, energy facilities can withstand a significant terrorist attack.Terrorist resourcesSuch a conclusion becomes quite unavoidable when one considers the balanceof physical forces between terrorists and defenders of major energy