Brittle Power- PARTS 1-3 (+Notes) - Natural Capitalism Solutions

Notes 409owing to “a crossed wire in the firing safetymechanism.” The missile was apparently notrecovered from the hostile waters.152 Talbot & Dann 1981; SIPRI1978:63–82, which also documents some correspondingSoviet, British, and French incidents.153 Chester & Chester 1976:329. Weaponseffects are described in detail in such governmenthandbooks as The Effects of NuclearWeapons, which come supplied with the AtomicEnergy Commission’s handy “Nuclear BombEffects Computer.”154 Fetter 1981.155 Ibid.156 Lovins 1980.157 Gervasi 1981:207.158 Comptroller General of the U.S. 1977:6.159 NRC 1975.160 Kendall et al. 1977:61.161 Beyea 1980. Ramberg (1980:33–35)cites similar results. It is by disregarding longterm,long-range effects that an AtomicIndustrial Forum spokesman was able to say(Dembart 1981) that a large nuclear bombwould cause “hundreds, maybe thousands” oftimes as much radioactive release as a reactorbreach that it caused.162 Beyea 1980. He assumed that less of thecore would escape than would be the case if abomb exploded near the reactor.163 Most commentators have uncriticallyaccepted contentions by the Sandia group(whose supporting analysis, if any, is unavailableto the public), in the Rasmussen Reportitself (which supplied none—it nowhere consideredsabotage), and elsewhere that sabotagecould not cause worse consequences than aserious accident. That finding has never beenjustified in open literature and “is very likelyuntrue” (Kendall et al. 1977:61).164 Fetter & Tsipis 1980, 1981.165 Fetter & Tsipis 1980, 1981.166 Ramberg (1980) cites other sources withsimilar or worse conclusions.167 Holdren 1981.168 Fetter & Tsipis 1980:29.169 Ibid.170 Holdren 1981.171 Royal Commission on EnvironmentalPollution 1976.172 Ramberg 1980:81.173 Solon & Rosenberg 1981; Nucleonics Week1981a (Swedish implementation).174 Ramberg 1980:44, 134–141.175 Beyea 1980.176 Kostmayer & Markey 1980.177 For example, reactors can become constipatedif there is no place to store their spentfuel (a problem that has lately required thehasty “densification” of many spent-fuel storagepools), or if there are not enough specialcasks in which to ship to spent fuel elsewhere.A reprocessing plant can likewise become constipatedif spent fuel arrives faster than technicalbreakdowns allow it to be processed. Thisis currently the cause of a serious and worseningproblem at the British and French plant forreprocessing spent fuel from gas-cooled,graphite-moderated reactors. The magnesiumalloycladding of those reactors’ metallic natural-uraniumfuel corrodes in a matter of yearswhen stored (as it normally is) in water.Persistent problems at both reprocessingplants have led to an increasing backlog of rottingfuel in storage pools. This increases operationalproblems and occupational hazards,leading to still more breakdowns and, on occasion,to strikes. At the French plant at Cap dela Hague, this cascading slowdown has divertedmuch of the capacity originally meant forhandling oxide (LWR) fuel. This in turn hasso reduced the plutonium output from LaHague that France must buy British plutoniumto fuel the Super-Phénix fast breeder.178 See Gorleben International Review 1979:Ch. 1.179 Lovins 1982.180 See e.g., Emshwiller 1980, 1981;Hershey 1981; Bupp 1981; O’Donnell 1981;Marshall 1981a; Parisi 1981; Shearson LoebRhodes, Inc. 1981:4–9; Allison et al. 1981.181 E.g., Lifton 1967; Del Tredici 1980;Perelman 1979. The official analyses of theThree Mile Island accident, though theyappear to have seriously underestimated theamount of radioactivity released and hencethe health effects from it, concluded that themajor effects were psychological.182 Nuclear Engineering International 1974.183 Ramberg 1978:4; Farhar et al. 1980.Polls in 1981 showed higher anxiety.184 Jenkins 1975:7.185 Jenkins 1975. An argument often linkedwith this one is that nobody would actually