Brittle Power- PARTS 1-3 (+Notes) - Natural Capitalism Solutions

50Brittle Poweradded to oil (presumably refined products in particular) to hasten its decomposition.69 While the results of that research are not published, it is known thatsome refined products can be stored for only a few months to years unless stabilizedby special additives. 70 Presumably destabilizing additives, whether microbiologicalor otherwise, also exist. It is hard to say whether such additives couldbecome a credible threat to oil storage and processing facilities. But strikinglyeffective instances of biological sabotage are already known, ranging fromreleasing moths in a cinema to sowing the spores of certain mushrooms which,on sprouting, hydraulically fracture any concrete that meanwhile has beenpoured over them. The adaptability of organisms and the ingenuity of someamateur biologists suggest that biological threats cannot be discounted. Already,such accidental infestations as Mediterranean fruitfly, gypsy moth, Corbicula inpower plants (Chapter Two), kudzu vines on much Southern land, and waterhyacinths on waterways suggest a considerable potential for mischief.Finally, an analogous problem may exist with electricity, because as muchharm can be caused by increasing as by interrupting its supply. Some manipulationsof electrical control systems may be able to increase grid voltages to levelswhich damage not only generating and transmission equipment but also widelydispersed distribution and end-use equipment. This has already happened byaccident, as in restoration after the July 1977 New York blackout described in thenext chapter. Alternatively, persistent low voltage or operation of only one of severalphases on multiphase lines can cause epidemics of burned-out motors andother equipment over a wide area: an oilfield operation lost one hundred fiftythreemotors in one evening in this way. 71 Repairing such widespread damage toend-use devices can be extremely slow and costly. As noted above, too, analogousinterference with gas distribution pressures can endanger large numbers ofcustomers simultaneously, even on the scale of an entire city.The elaborate technical system which fuels and powers America, then, isbuilt in such a way that it is inherently prone to large-scale failures which canbe difficult to predict, prevent, contain, control, and repair. So far, this countryhas experienced relatively few prolonged and widespread failures of energysupply. We pride ourselves on having the most reliable energy system on earth.But our relative success so far does not prove that the engineers have succeededin designing the system so it cannot suffer such failures. Rather, it may meanthat our nation has been very lucky, especially in the small number of peoplewho have so far had the skill and the desire to exploit the opportunity to causemassive dislocation. That the latter view is more plausible than the former willbecome clearer as the following eight chapters apply the general observationsabove to specific instances, starting with a case study of one of the most celebratedenergy failures of the New York City electrical grid on 13–14 July 1977.