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Brittle Power- PARTS 1-3 (+Notes) - Natural Capitalism Solutions

Brittle Power- PARTS 1-3 (+Notes) - Natural Capitalism Solutions

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Chapter Nine: Oil and Gas 117input terminal, for example, described by a company official as a most criticalfacility, had a catwalk that went over the fence from a public road to the buildinghousing computer controls for the entire Capline system. Entry to thebuilding was uncontrolled during the day, and only a locked door protectedthe computer itself. Both Capline and Colonial pumping stations have evenbeen burglarized by juveniles (who, fortunately, did not damage or misuse theequipment). Access to many key plants was uncontrolled or poorly controlled.Communications and backup power were poor. At a major Colonial input stationwith a peak capacity of one million three hundred thousand barrels perday, for example—equivalent to a tenth of America’s total rate of crude oil consumption—themain and back-up power transformers were both accessibleand were near each other. 144 “Why there is a total lack of security around such[an electrical] installation...is almost beyond comprehension.” 145 Simply reducingfrom afar the line voltage supplied to a facility’s motor or electronic systemscan cause damage that takes months to repair. 146Many supposedly complementary pipelines parallel each other so closelythat in practical effect they are co-located and co-vulnerable:Some major crude and product lines are extremely close to each other as theyextend from Texas and Louisiana...northeast....Damage at certain locations...couldstop the flow of most of the gas and petroleum products now being delivered to theeastern U.S. 147The fact that [the Colonial and Plantation]...systems come together at a number ofpoints in their [parallel] route is a built-in weakness from a vulnerability point ofview. A nuclear attack [or sabotage] focused at or near certain points of interchangebetween lines could create a major disruption of the major portions of the entire system.A view of a pipeline map shows flexibility at the intrastate level. It is possiblefor one pipeline system to sell to another locally. But, once the product is dischargedinto the interstate system, there is a considerable lack of flexibility. 148Further, the buffer stocks of oil downstream of pipelines are generally toosmall to cope with the duration of interruption that would be expected if aninterchange, pumping station, input terminal, river crossing, or control systemwere damaged (that is, months rather than days). As mentioned earlier, averagerefinery crude stocks are about three to five days. 149 Typical Colonialreceivers’ market stocks are also in the range of five to ten days. A two-weekinterruption of service in 1973, when difficulties arose in repairing a break ina remote area of Texas, “became critical for many Colonial shippers.” 150Arctic pipelinesThe Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS, not to be confused with the

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