Brittle Power- PARTS 1-3 (+Notes) - Natural Capitalism Solutions

142Disasters Waiting to Happenrorism might do and what the consequences—radiological, social, and economic—mightbe. The chapter also briefly considers the special problems of illicitnuclear bombs and how they make nuclear reactors more vulnerable.For simplicity, this treatment• considers only fission reactors–not potential future fusion reactors (whichwould have analogous but milder safety and waste problems and would alsoprovide routes–though different ones that fission–for spreading bombs).• largely restricts itself to the type of commercial power reactor used in theUnited States–light-water reactors (LWRs)–rather than other types such asthe Canadian CANDU or the proposed liquid-metal fast breeder. For purposesof this discussion, these design distinctions do not give rise to importantdifferences of principle. Differences of design between LWRs built in theUnited States and abroad are also too detailed for treatment here, but do notsignificantly change the conclusions.• does not explore the implications of whether or not the spent nuclear fuel isreprocessed; this too does not much affect the conclusions. Basic economicsmake it unlikely that a commercial American reprocessing industry will develop.However, enough reprocessing plants already exist–for military purposesin the U.S. and for mixed commercial and military use in Europe–to make itworth considering briefly the consequences of releases from those plants’radioactive inventories.• does not explicitly consider the numerous teaching and research reactorsnow in operation. It is important to note, however, that both the likelihoodand the consequences of sabotage may be comparable for these small reactorsand for large commercial power reactors, since the smaller reactors are oftenin the middle of large cities, take few or no security precautions, and have nocontainment buildings.• does not consider in detail certain federal nuclear facilities, damage to whichcould have serious consequences for public health and for the military nuclearprogram. 7Nuclear terrorism: intentions and incidentsThe plausibility of nuclear terrorism is best inferred not only from a studyof the technical potential for it, but from what terrorists have said and done.Low-level attacks on nuclear facilities have in fact become so common, andthe level of violence is escalating so steadily, 8 that it seems only a matter oftime before a major attack is successfully attempted.International terrorists are directly reported to be showing an increasing