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ENCYCLOPEDIA OF Espionage, Intelligence, and Security Volume ...

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Black Chamberminimum, overburden medical infrastructure. Medical personnel<strong>and</strong> supplies would be in short supply. As well, thecosts of responding to attacks would cause economichavoc. Alternatively, a biological weapon that spared humansbut targeted domestic animals or crops could causefamine <strong>and</strong> economic ruin.On a local level, cities <strong>and</strong> communities are beingencouraged to develop specific response procedures inthe event of bioterrorism. Most hospitals are now requiredto have response plans in place as part of their accreditationrequirements.Another aspect of prevention focuses on the drinkingwater supply of communities. Many microorganisms ortheir poisons readily dissolve in water, <strong>and</strong> so can bespread to a population virtually undetected. As well, watersupplies <strong>and</strong> distribution systems have bee designed forefficiency of water disinfection <strong>and</strong> deliver, not for security.Because of this, many communities have placed extrasecurity on water supply <strong>and</strong> treatment facilities. The U.S.Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has increasedmonitoring <strong>and</strong> working with local water suppliers todevelop emergency response plans.It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss specificpersonal protective measures. Indeed, given the complexities<strong>and</strong> ever-changing threat, it would not be prudentto offer such specific medical advice. However, anumber of general issues <strong>and</strong> measures can be discussed.For example, military surplus gas masks provide only theillusion of protection. They offer no real protection againstbiological agents, <strong>and</strong> should not be bought for that purpose.Personnel stockpiling of antibiotics is unwise. Thepotency of antibiotics such as Cipro declines with time.Moreover, the inappropriate use of antibiotics actually canlead to the development of bacterial resistance <strong>and</strong> aconsequential lowering of antibiotic effectiveness.On the other h<strong>and</strong>, a few days supply of food <strong>and</strong>water <strong>and</strong> the identification of rooms in homes <strong>and</strong> officesthat can be temporarily sealed with duct tape to reduceoutside air infiltration is a wise precaution.More specific response plans <strong>and</strong> protective measureare often based upon existing assessments of the dangerposed by specific diseases <strong>and</strong> the organisms that producethe disease. For example, Anthrax (Bacillus anthracis),Botulism (Clostridium botulinum toxin), Plague (Yersiniapestis, Smallpox (Variola major, Tularemia (Francisellatularensis, viral hemorrhagic fevers (e.g., Ebola, Marburg),<strong>and</strong> arenaviruses (e.g., Lassa) are considered high-riskhigh-priority. These agents do share a common trait ofbeing easily spread from person to person. And, they allcan kill many of those who are infected. But, the natures ofthe diseases they cause are very different. A response thatis effective against one microorganism may well be uselessagainst another.The protective measures that are in place againstsmallpox <strong>and</strong> anthrax remain controversial. Vaccinesagainst both diseases are available. However, both vaccinescarry the risk of serious side effects. In the absence ofEncyclopedia of <strong>Espionage</strong>, <strong>Intelligence</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>Security</strong>a confirmed case of smallpox, the CDC’s position is thatthe risks of resuming general smallpox vaccination outweighthe potential benefits. Vaccine is available for use ina bioterrorist emergency, when the benefits of mass vaccinationcould well outweigh the risks of harm due to thevaccine. Moreover, vaccines delivered <strong>and</strong> injected duringthe incubation period for smallpox (approximately 12days) convey at least some protection from the ravages ofthe disease.Also controversial remains the safety <strong>and</strong> effectivenessof an anthrax vaccine used primarily by militarypersonnel.BOOKS:Henderson, D.A., <strong>and</strong> T.V. Inglesby. Bioterrorism: Guidelinesfor Medical <strong>and</strong> Public Health Management.Chicago:American Medical Association, 2002.Inglesby, Thomas V. “Bioterrorist Threats: What the InfectiousDisease Community Should Know about Anthrax<strong>and</strong> Plague.” Emerging Infections 5 Washington, D.C.:American Society for Microbiology Press, 2001.ELECTRONIC:World Health Organization. “Strengthening Global Preparednessfor Defense against Infectious DiseaseThreats.” Statement to the United States Senate Committeeon Foreign Relations Hearing on The Threat ofBioterrorism <strong>and</strong> the Spread of Infectious Diseases. 5September 2001. (24 November 2002).SEE ALSOAnthrax, Terrorist Use as a Biological WeaponBiological WarfareUSAMRIID (United States Army Medical Research Instituteof Infectious DiseasesVaccinesBlack Boxes.SEE Flight Data Recorders.❚ DAVID TULLOCHBlack ChamberThe term “black chamber” has come to represent anycode-breaking organization, but was originally applied togroups of code-breakers associated with the French postalservice that intercepted, read, copied <strong>and</strong> decoded diplomaticmail. In the twentieth century, Americans created ablack chamber to intercept <strong>and</strong> decode radio transmissions(telegraphs) rather than postal mail.127

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