ENCYCLOPEDIA OF Espionage, Intelligence, and Security Volume ...

Dual Use TechnologyUndersea warfare (USW) also makes use of sonar,which could be applied in searching a mammogram x rayfor minuscule abnormalities. Such was the focus of aprogram under development in a partnership between theNUWC Technology Transfer Program, the Weapons SystemsDirectorate, and the Faulkner Sagoff Center for BreastHealth Care in Boston. Another promising partnershipwas a joint project with Precision Signal Incorporated ofBoca Raton, Florida, to produce an imaging unit capable ofdetecting small objects buried under the sea floor. Calledthe Ocean Bottom Profiler, the device could be used todetect hazardous materials and other items that have sunkto the bottom of the ocean.The need for controls. Great advances carry with them anumber of potential risks, not least of which is the chancethat military innovations may be stolen or appropriated byhostile powers. This reality came to the forefront in thelate 1990s, as persons both inside and outside the ranks ofthe federal government became concerned over allegedefforts by the People’s Republic of China to appropriateU.S. military technology for its own purposes. Similarly,concerns were raised as to the use of sophisticated technologiesby terrorist groups or terror-sponsoring nationsto develop weapons of mass destruction.“In a perfect world,” Commerce Department Undersecretaryfor Export Administration William Reinsch toldreporters in January 1998, “I would have multilateralagreements that would require consensus” before sensitivetechnologies could be exported. As Reinsch noted,“Right now there is no veto [for the United States], butduring the Cold War, if the French wanted to sell somethingto the Chinese, we could block it.”Reinsch, the senior government official responsiblefor issuing export licenses on dual-use technologies, wasreferring to a Cold War-era organization known as COCOM,or the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral ExportControls. When COCOM was in operation, its membership—composedof industrialized democracies—hadto reach unanimous agreement before civil or militaryhardware could be exported to states such as the SovietUnion and the Warsaw Pact nations, China, Cuba, NorthKorea, more aggressive states in the Middle East, andSouth Africa under the apartheid regime.With the end of the Cold War, COCOM had disbanded,and no similar mechanism was in place. In lieu of suchagreements, the United States and the nations of WesternEurope relied on agreements of mutual consent, but theseoften broke down in the face of conflicting views as to thethreat posed by certain nations. In the case of North Korea,most of the world’s advanced nations agreed that it poseda threat, but when it came to Iran—a nation the UnitedStates accused of supporting terrorism—U.S. and Europeanviews differed. In order to prevent the illegal transferof dual-use and other sensitive technologies to hostilenations, Reinsch called for an increased vigilance on thepart of vendor companies, as well as the tasking of moreU.S. agents to monitor potential transfers.❚ FURTHER READING:PERIODICALS:Baus, Theresa. “Dual Use Technology.” Naval Forces 20,no. 3 (1999): S54–S55.Muradian, Vago. “Better Export Controls Needed to CheckDual-Use Technologies.” Defense Daily 198, no. 14 (January22, 1998): 1.Palfrey, Terry. “The Hidden Legacy of Scott: Weapons ofMass Destruction and the UK Government Proposals toControl the Transfer of Technology by Intangible Means.”International Review of Law, Computers & Technology13, no. 2 (August 1999): 163–181.Sharke, Paul. “The Start of a New Movement.” MechanicalEngineering 124, no. 8 (August 2002): 47–49.ELECTRONIC:Dual Use Science and Technology Program. (April 14, 2003).SEE ALSOInformation SecuritySatellite Technology Exports to the People’s Republic ofChina (PRC)Technology Transfer Center (NTTC), Emergency ResponseTechnology ProgramEncyclopedia of Espionage, Intelligence, and Security365