ENCYCLOPEDIA OF Espionage, Intelligence, and Security Volume ...

Cuban Missile CrisisThe New York Times called “Cuba’s intelligence apparatusthe “Little Spy Engine That Could.” Despite astagnant economy crippled by Castro’s policies—and sustainedalmost entirely by foreign aid and tourism—theCubans have managed to maintain a security apparatusunequalled by that of any similarly small country otherthan perhaps Israel. And whereas, by comparison, Israelhas a prosperous economy, Cuba has had to weather theloss of considerable aid following the collapse of theSoviet Union in the late 1908s and early 1990s. The post-Soviet Russian government has continued to offer supportto its old ally, but on a much smaller scale than did itscommunist predecessor at the height of the Cold War.The administration of President George W. Bush hasaccused Cuba of aligning itself with worldwide terroristnetworks. Indeed, Castro has maintained friendly relationswith all three members of what President Bushhas publicly labeled the “axis of evil”: Iran, Iraq, andNorth Korea.❚ FURTHER READING:BOOKS:Bennett, Richard M. Espionage: An Encyclopedia of Spiesand Secrets. London: Virgin Books, 2002.PERIODICALS:Golden, Tim. “White House Wary of Cuba’s Little SpyEngine That Could.” New York Times. (January 5, 2003):p. 1.3.ELECTRONIC:Cuban American National Foundation. (January 22, 2003).Cuban Intelligence Agencies. Fellowship of American Scientists. (January 22, 2003).SEE ALSOKGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti, USSR Committeeof State Security)❚ LARRY GILMANCuban Missile CrisisThe Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 was triggered bythe Soviet deployment to Cuba of medium-range, nucleararmedballistic missiles. The United States demanded thatthe Soviet Union remove these missiles and imposed anaval blockade on Cuba, threatening to sink any Sovietships that approached the island without permitting theirEncyclopedia of Espionage, Intelligence, and Securitycargoes to be inspected. Eventually, the Soviet Union(U.S.S.R.) announced that it would remove the missiles,and the crisis ended. Most historians affirm that the worldhas never been closer to global nuclear war than duringthe 13 days of the Cuban missile crisis (Oct. 14–Oct.28, 1962).The roots of the Cuban missile crisis go back, in part,to an earlier crisis—the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of Cubaby Cuban expatriates trained, supplied, and directed bythe U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. The purpose of thefailed invasion was to overthrow Fidel Castro’s leftist ruleof Cuba, but had two unintended effects. First, it frightenedCastro, causing him to make concessions to theU.S.S.R, which wanted to place military bases on theisland of Cuba, in exchange for protection against furtherU.S. invasion attempts. Second, it heightened tensionsbetween the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Khrushchev, the Sovietleader, read U.S. weakness in the Bay of Pigs fiasco, andblustered publicly that he might retaliate by driving theU.S. out of West Berlin. U.S. President John Kennedy, inreturn, openly boasted that the U.S. possessed manymore (and more accurate and deliverable) nuclear missilesand warheads than the U.S.S.R., and would considerstriking first with them if it ever found itself at a militarydisadvantage. Kennedy’s claim was true; in 1962, theU.S.S.R. had at most 20 or 30—perhaps as few as four—functional, deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles(ICBMs); the U.S. had several hundred. Nevertheless, Kennedyhad claimed, during his presidential campaign, thatthe incumbent Eisenhower’s administration had allowedthe Soviets to get ahead of the U.S. in missiles, causing a”missile gap.“ A missile gap did exist, as Kennedy knew,but in reverse; it had always been the U.S. that was farahead of the U.S.S.R. in such weapons. Once in office,Kennedy dropped the old story about the ”missile gap“and brandished the United States’s nuclear superiorityopenly against Khrushchev.Khruschev’s response was to secretly build missilebases on Cuban soil to compensate for Soviet inferiority inICBMs. These missiles were medium-range and intermediate-range,rather than intercontinental, but from Cubacould reach the entire continental U.S. except its northwestcorner. Similar missiles had been by stationed theUnited States for years in Turkey, which borders southernRussia. Castro gave permission to the Soviets to buildCuban missile bases in trade for a promise of protectionagainst U.S. invasion and for cancellation of Cuban monetarydebts.Construction of the Cuban bases proceeded throughoutthe summer of 1962. The U.S. was aware, from variousintelligence sources, that the Soviets were building upmilitary forces on the island, but did not realize thatintermediate-range nuclear weapons were part of theplan. Kennedy issued warnings to Khrushchev that theU.S. would not tolerate a major military buildup in Cuba,but would do ”whatever must be done“ to guarantee U.S.security; Kennedy and his advisors believed that Khrushchevwould take these grave warnings seriously, and were293