ENCYCLOPEDIA OF Espionage, Intelligence, and Security Volume ...

Cambridge University Spy Ringthe United States, and report defections to Soviet authorities.After returning to London in 1951, Philby continuedhis career as a mole (double agent) for over a decade.Guy Burgess. Guy Burgess (1910–1963) worked as a radiocorrespondent for the BBC from 1936 through 1944. DuringWorld War II, Burgess was also employed by Britishintelligence agency, MI5. Burgess was somewhat successfulin transmitting messages to Soviet agents viaradio broadcasts and smuggled several key documents toMoscow. Burgess stole some of the most sensitive informationin the career of the Cambridge spy ring. Whileworking for MI-5 in London, he smuggled copies of documentsrelating to nuclear weapons development. He alsoinformed the Soviet government of United States andBritish plants to create the North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO), a European-American military alliance system.In 1950, Kim Philby requested that Burgess be assignedto the Washington, D.C., bureau of the BritishForeign Office. Burgess worked as Philby’s assistant untilhe came under the suspicion of British intelligence. Philbythen sent Burgess back to London, presumably to avoidsuspicion upon himself.Donald Maclean. The third member of the Cambridge spyring, Donald Maclean (1913–1983), worked closely withBurgess. After graduating from Cambridge, Macleanworked in diplomatic service. In 1950, he became head ofthe Foreign Office’s American Department.While working at the British Embassy in Washington,D.C., Maclean was the main source of information regardingUnited States and British communications, advisingMoscow on Anglo-American policy. In 1951, Maclean wastapped to be the British representative on the American-British-Canadian council on the sharing of atomic secrets.With Burgess, Maclean used his position to funnel highlyclassified atomic secrets to Soviet military intelligence.The two men did not steal technical information about theatomic bomb, but did provide Moscow with accurateassessments of the American atomic arsenal, productioncapabilities, and nuclear resources.The Defections of Maclean, Burgess, and Philby. In 1949,Robert Lamphere, an FBI counterintelligence agent workingwith the Venona project, discovered that someonewas sending telegraph messages from the British Embassyin Washington, D.C. to Moscow. The sender, under thecodename “Homer” was later identified as Maclean. Philby,while working in Washington, learned of the FBI investigationof Maclean. Philby then devised a plan to warn Macleanof his impending exposure, while protecting himself andthe rest the Cambridge spies.Philby and Burgess agreed that Burgess would endeavorto be recalled by the Foreign Office to London,where he could arrange to meet with, and warn Macleanwithout arousing suspicion. Since Burgess had lived in theEncyclopedia of Espionage, Intelligence, and SecurityPhilby family home while assigned to his Washington,D.C. post, Philby cautioned Burgess not to attempt todefect to the Soviet Union with Maclean should he decideto escape. Burgess agreed to escort Maclean to safety, butto return to Britain to avoid drawing attention to othermembers of the Cambridge ring.Days before he was scheduled to be questioned byBritish and American intelligence officials, Maclean, withBurgess, escaped to France. Once on the continent, theymade their way to Moscow via a network of KGB safehouses. Soviet authorities insisted that Burgess defectwith Maclean. Burgess lived in Russia until his death in1963, though he reportedly did not attempt to furtherparticipate in the Soviet government. Maclean learnedRussian and spent his remaining years working as aneconomic analyst and advisor on Western policy.When British intelligence learned of Burgess andMaclean’s defection, and acknowledged their roles in Sovietespionage operations, Philby was immediately placedunder suspicion as a possible Soviet mole. In 1955, hedeftly weathered MI-5 and MI-6 interrogation. After beingreleased from his job at MI-6, he later was permitted toreturn to the civil service. Philby continued to act as a molefor Soviet intelligence for several more years, though hehad limited access to top-secret materials.In 1963, under renewed suspicion of espionage, Philbytook a position as Foreign Office correspondent in Beirut,Lebanon. Later that year, a Soviet intelligence agent defectedto the West. While being interrogated by Australianand British intelligence in Sydney, the defector namedPhilby as one of the Soviet’s greatest human intelligenceassets. Philby quickly defected to the Soviet Union, wherehe spent the rest of his life. He worked with the KGB,training spies for operation in the West. Cambridge spyring member Anthony Blunt aided Philby’s final escape.Anthony Blunt. Though not the most active spy in theCambridge ring, Anthony Blunt (1907–1983) aided Sovietagents’ recruitment efforts at Cambridge. Blunt suppliedthe names of possible moles, and regularly attended communistpolitical meetings in search of young recruits.Blunt received degrees in history and art history fromCambridge. At the outbreak of World War II, Blunt went towork for British Intelligence. Blunt lacked the high-levelsecurity clearances possessed by other Cambridge spyring members, however he was successful in smugglingphotographs of documents regarding British troop locationsand counterintelligence reports to his KGB contact,Yuri Modin. Blunt also provided information to Sovietmilitary intelligence regarding British code breaking effortsagainst the Germans. After the war, he cultivated areputation as a leading national academic. Socially, heoften refused to comment on national and internationalpolitical matters, leading colleagues to believe he hadgrown disillusioned and possessed little interest in thesubject.153