ConflictBarometer_2015
ConflictBarometer_2015
ConflictBarometer_2015
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MEASURES OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION<br />
AUTHORITATIVE DECISIONS BY THE ICJ<br />
The year <strong>2015</strong> has seen the International Court of<br />
Justice (ICJ) make four judgements and nine court orders.<br />
While no new cases were introduced to the Court in<br />
<strong>2015</strong>, three existing cases were concluded.<br />
CROATIA v. SERBIA<br />
On February 3, the ICJ delivered its judgment in the case<br />
concerning ''Application of the Convention on the<br />
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide<br />
(Croatia v. Serbia), rejecting both Croatia's claim and Serbia's<br />
counter-claim over alleged violations of the Genocide<br />
Convention, committed during the armed conflict from<br />
1991 until 1995.<br />
The application was filed by the Government of the Republic<br />
of Croatia against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on<br />
07/02/99, and invoked ''Article IX of the Genocide Convention<br />
as the jurisdictional basis of the Court." Following<br />
February 2003, when the FRY notified the Court that its<br />
name had changed to ''Serbia and Montenegro," and<br />
Mon-tenegro's subsequent declaration of independence in<br />
2006, Serbia remained the sole respondent in the case.<br />
Serbia's counter-claim was filed on 01/04/10. Public<br />
hearings on the merits of both, Croatia's claim and<br />
Serbia's counter-claim, were held in 2014. In its final<br />
judgement on February 3 the Court underlined the<br />
sovereignty of both States after having emerged from the<br />
break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It<br />
further recalled that, shortly after Croatia's declaration of<br />
independence on 06/25/91, an armed conflict broke out<br />
between Croatia's armed forces, the so-called Serb forces<br />
created by parts of the Serb minority within Croatia, as well<br />
as several anti-independence paramilitary groups and, from<br />
September 1991 onwards, the Yugoslav National Army<br />
(JNA).<br />
Croatia claimed that genocide had been committed from<br />
late 1991 until 1995, when Serb forces and the JNA controlled<br />
approximately one-third of Croatian territory within<br />
its boundaries of the SFRY. Following a sequence of military<br />
operations in the spring and summer of 1995, Croatia regained<br />
control over the greater part of the previously lost<br />
territory leading up to Operation Storm in August 1995,<br />
during which the genocidal acts asserted by Serbia's counterclaim<br />
allegedly took place.<br />
Croatia had argued that certain attacks were not simply<br />
directed against an opposing military force, but ''against the<br />
civil population and subsequently that the aim and intent<br />
of these attacks was the destruction of ethnic Croats in the<br />
region." While the Court found that acts perpetrated by the<br />
JNA and Serb forces against ethnic Croats constituted the<br />
actus reus of genocide ''within the meaning of Article II (a)<br />
and (b) of the 1948 Genocide Convention, the acts that<br />
would fall under Article II (c) and (d) could not be sufficiently<br />
established under the same parameters." Furthermore, the<br />
Court concluded that the crucial ''mental element of intent<br />
to destroy an ethnic group, the dolus specialis of genocide,<br />
had not been established." In fact, the ICJ found that the<br />
aim toward the group in question was one of forceful<br />
displace-ment, not of destruction, and so dismissed Croatia's<br />
claim in its entirety.<br />
Serbia's counter-claim accused Croatia of committing genocide<br />
during and after Operation Storm in 1995. One crucial<br />
piece of evidence here was the transcript of a meeting held<br />
between Franjo Tudjman, then President of the Republic of<br />
Croatia, and the country's military leaders on the island of<br />
Brioni in order to prepare Operation Storm.<br />
Serbia had argued that this transcript was proof of the aim of<br />
the alleged genocide acts perpetrated during Operation<br />
Storm. However, the Court found that the existence of an<br />
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the national or<br />
ethnic Serbs in Croatia had not been sufficiently<br />
demonstrated and hence the inten-tional element of<br />
genocide, the dolus specialis, was lacking. While certain<br />
acts committed by the forces of the Republic of Croatia<br />
fell within the definition of Article II (a) and (b), and<br />
constituted the actus reus of genocide, they were not of<br />
sufficient gravity to demonstrate reasonable existence of<br />
genocidal intent. The ICJ found that neither genocide, nor<br />
other violations of the Genocide Convention had been<br />
proven, and rejected Serbia's counter-claim in its entirety.<br />
Both governments accepted the judgement. While the outcome<br />
of this ruling was widely expected, it took the<br />
Court 16 years to decide that neither state had a claim<br />
against the other.<br />
This, and the financial expense of the proceeding had, yet<br />
again, made some critics question the significance and<br />
efficiency of the ICJ. Others however, have pointed out that<br />
this case highlighted the inherent difficulty in legally<br />
applying the Genocide Convention. This being primarily due<br />
to its narrow definition of genocide; demanding proof of<br />
definitive intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a<br />
national, ethnical, racial or religious group.<br />
TIMOR-LESTE v. AUSTRALIA<br />
The case concerning ''Questions relating to the Seizure and<br />
Detention of Certain Documents and Data (Timor-Leste v.<br />
Australia)" was brought before the ICJ by the Democratic<br />
Republic of Timor-Leste against the Commonwealth of Australia<br />
[→ Timor-Leste – Australia]. This occurred amid<br />
strained relations between the two states over a spy scandal<br />
result-ing in Timor-Leste contesting the validity of the<br />
''Treaty on Certain Maritime arrangements in the Timor Sea<br />
regulating the joint exploration and utilisation of gas and oil<br />
deposits in the Timor Sea" estimated to be worth USD 40<br />
billion at the Permanent Court of Arbitration on 12/03/13.<br />
On 12/17/13 Timor-Leste instituted proceedings against<br />
Australia at the ICJ, contending that on 12/03/13 agents of<br />
the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, ''allegedly<br />
acting under a warrant issued by the Attorney-General of<br />
Australia, seized documents and electronic data," inter alia,<br />
from the office of a legal adviser to Timor-Leste in the<br />
Australian capital Canberra in order to gain intelligence of<br />
the applicant's strategy and negotiation positions. The documents<br />
in question contained correspondence between the<br />
government of Timor-Leste and its legal advisers, relating to<br />
the pending ''Arbitration under the Timor Sea Treaty of 20<br />
May 2002" between the two states. Timor-Leste contended<br />
that Australia, through seizure and detention of<br />
these documents and data, had violated its sovereignty and<br />
state property under international law, further requesting<br />
that Australia should issue a formal apology and<br />
immediately return the documents and data, as well as any<br />
copies of the material.<br />
On 03/03/14, the Court ordered Australia not to use the<br />
seized materials to the disadvantage of Timor-Leste until the<br />
case has been concluded and to keep the seized documents<br />
under seal. Furthermore, Australia was ordered not to interfere<br />
in any way in communications between Timor-Leste<br />
and its legal advisers in relation to the pending ''Arbitration<br />
under the Timor Sea Treaty of 20 May 2002" between the<br />
two States or with ''any future bilateral negotiations<br />
concerning maritime delimitation.<br />
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