art-e-conomy _ reader - marko stamenkovic

y the co-existence and competition of regional, national and supranational integrative
organisations. The imperialistic ‘discourse’, analysing the post-socialist transition,
could also throw light upon the structural foundations of new East-West relations in
Europe. Although this relationship has been dominated by an overwhelming hostility
during the Cold War, many have entertained the idea that the ‘other’ is ‘basically’ no
different from ‘us’, except that totalitarian rule does not allow the unfolding of this
fundamental similarity or even identity. The fact that Europe is no longer divided in
two has reversed this categorisation. There are no serious ‘differences’ between East
and West anymore, thus ‘the East’ itself has to answer directly for all of its handicaps
or less advantageous qualities. Hence the threefold Western categorisation of the
East today. The East is judged first of all in terms of the prevailing ‘freedom’ there
(with respect to common democratic values and the openness of the economic
system), and secondly in terms of ‘collective guilt’. The new freedom shared with the
West does not save the East from the shadow of collective political guilt. These two
categories are coupled with a third aspect of the East-West relationship, namely the
condition of ‘indebtedness’. Although the West loudly celebrates common freedom
and market economy, it has not dispelled the shadow of collective guilt and has also
categorised the East in terms of a debtor-creditor relationship (yet there have been no
efforts in the West to relate this third aspect in any way either to the anti-totalitarian
ideology or allegations of collective guilt).
The imperialistic ‘discourse’ could scarcely appear in political and social rhetoric,
since the classical and harmonising rhetoric of the new situation has in effect morally
prevented an open articulation of the imperialistic ‘discourse’. Who could have turned
to the basic ideas and definitions of the imperialistic ‘discourse’ in the euphoric
atmosphere celebrating the open society and the end of history? Who could have
mentioned the imperialistic repartitioning of the post-socialist world or that of the
world-economy at the time of the worldwide triumph of liberalism? This has a broader
theoretical implication and a more concrete one as well. The broader, theoretical
conclusion to be drawn from the temporary suppression of the imperialistic ‘discourse’
is that these two ‘discourses’, labelled as ‘end of history’ and ‘imperialistic’, can
never figure together in one rhetoric. When one of these prevails, the other will only
be used in a softer key on the political stage (it is another matter that this immanent
relationship may cause and has indeed caused very serious political damages). The
more concrete implication is that in a morally unambiguous situation, such as the
emergence of a new democracy, a body politic will inevitably develop a ‘schizophrenic’
rhetoric when forced to use these two ‘discourses’ separately, a morally harmonious
‘discourse’ based on democratic ideals and the imperialistic ‘discourse’ based on
Machiavelian principles.
The ‘discourse’ of decisionism may describe other important aspects of the
post-socialist transition. The notion has first been introduced by Carl Schmitt, the
German political scientist and legal philosopher. It is a key category in political
decision-making and the exercise of political power (and thus also in the exercise
of democratically legitimised power). This notion constitutes the foundation of this
prominent ‘discourse’ in a number of ways. First, it creates a theoretical framework
to the understanding of Gorbatschev’s perestroika from a scientific point of view
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