art-e-conomy _ reader - marko stamenkovic

also tells of strong criticism and even of irony. In the final analysis, this rhetoric has
been the very opposite of the critique of Antall’s decisionism. In the case of József
Antall, Hungary’s first democratically elected premier, decisionism was treated as
the symbol of an entire political regime, whereas Gyula Horn’s decisionism was
approached and digested with a degree of understanding expressed in the plebeian
irony of public opinion.
‘Discourses’ categorise the process of the transition, and help to throw more light
upon this process through these categories. The next ‘discourse’ to be discussed
is absolutely vital to an understanding of the transition process. This ‘discourse’
concerns the problem of elites and the replacing of one elite with another. The dramatic
significance of this ‘discourse’ lies in the fact that a thorough replacement of one
elite by another occurs rather seldom in history. Many observers and analysts have
expected that the post-socialist transition, given that it is a unique and unprecedented
historical event, will bring about such a radical supplanting of one elite by another.
Few would have not forecasted at least a partial reshuffling of the elite.
The ‘discourse’ focusing on the supersession of elites contributes a number of
specific insights, but it also contains critical elements which can be traced back to
the lack of available models to explain the post-socialist transition. From the very
outset, there has been a contradiction due to the discrepant categorisations of the
elites of the old system. This elite has been by definition the elite of feasible socialism,
a system that has eventually dissolved itself. At the same time, during the last two
decades of socialist rule, the same elite has made a serious effort to underpin its
political position with professional expertise and legitimation. Consequently, when
relieved, the public image of this elite has no longer been unambiguous. Added to this
difficulty of categorisation is the fact that the entire Hungarian transition has been
conditioned by a peculiar ‘agreement’ between old and new elites. The partly explicit
and partly tacit terms of this agreement have further complicated the situation. It is
extremely difficult at this point to separate substantial and structural aspects peculiar
to Hungarian political development from those generally related to the historical
problem of the supersession of elites. The political struggle of old and new elites is in
itself not an unusual phenomenon, but the ‘discourse’ of the supersession of elites
has shown that the consensus and communication concerning the supersession of
elites has quickly broken down in Hungary in the absence of comprehensive models.
It has also been shown that the majority of the old elite has correctly perceived what
its task ought to be under the complicated circumstances of the transition whereas
the majority of the new elite has failed to come to terms with its own role in the
transition. The old elite has achieved an image of professional expertise and political
experience by means that were seen as justifiable and acceptable by public opinion.
By contrast, the new elite could not bring public opinion to accept its own treatment
of the old elite. They have also been rejected, of course, because they could not
present themselves as a professionally and politically efficient elite. Added to this
are a number of other consequences of the absence of models. One of these is also
well shown by the ‘elitist’ ‘discourse’, namely that many groups of Hungarian society
have very quickly had to abandon hopes of becoming part of the new elite in a new
democratic system whatever their past or present merits may have been.
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