art-e-conomy _ reader - marko stamenkovic

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(though obviously the theory and ‘discourse’ of decisionism is not the only possible
theoretical approach to the perestroika). Though unintentionally, Gorbatschev’s
political career has amply justified the main tenet of the theory of decisionism.
Political actors exploiting opportunities which result from their control of decisionmaking
procedures can bring about changes that sociological research concentrating
exclusively on social causes and political institutions would never be able to explain
(and this remains the case even when their control is democratically legitimised).
Obviously, I cannot go into all the implications that the decisionist ‘discourse’ may
have with respect to the analysis of the perestroika. I have only tried to show in
general the manifold sociological relevance of the illustrative connection between
‘perestroika’ and ‘decisionism’.
The theory of decisionism, however, is also crucial to an understanding of the
processes of the post-socialist transition inasmuch as it turns our attention towards
the markedly decisionist elements in post-socialist democracies. These elements
have contributed a great deal to shaping the new image of post-socialist democracies.
Moreover, in using this ‘discourse’ one will also readily perceive the decisionist
components in the entire post-socialist world order. The importance of decision-making
procedures and decisionism is all the more remarkable as most political theorists,
especially neo-liberal theorists, led by their scientific (i.e. not political) preferences,
tend to neglect decisive aspects and favour political theories, the concepts of which
‘prescribe’ for political actors what they deem to be adequate political action.
The ‘discourse’ of decisionism appears quite one-sidedly in political rhetoric.
It seems evident that the rhetoric of decisionism is generated not by those who
control decision-making procedures, that is, make crucial decisions in ‘decisionist’
ways, but mainly by those who have to ‘endure’ the consequences of this, nowadays
democratic ‘decisionism’. A host of documents could be cited from the Hungarian
press to demonstrate the social critique of decision-making procedures in Hungary.
Anti-decisionist critique is primarily directed against leading figures of the government.
The decisionist governing style of both prime ministers, József Antall and later Gyula
Horn, has been critically exposed by this social rhetoric (the same is true of Péter
Boross who briefly acted as the Hungarian premier between the two prime ministers
mentioned above).
This anti-decisionist rhetoric has been differently expressed depending on which
leading politician’s governing style was targeted. After a brief period of hesitation,
József Antall’s decisionism has been interpreted as a governing style similar to that
of Miklós Horthy, Hungary’s governor in the interwar period. Consequently, antidecisionist
rhetoric has taken the form of an anti-Horthy’ist rhetoric, in other words,
rhetoric has raised the critique of József Antall’s decisionism to a ‘higher level’. The
critique of Gyula Horn’s decisionism has been expressed in a completely different
manner. In this case, critical rhetoric has assumed an almost jovial and plebeian tone.
Publicists and public opinion (more or less in agreement), calling him remarkably often
by his first name ‘Gyula’, like to talk about a strange figure who can get everything
done what he wants, is always responsive to social complaints and needs, and tries
to remedy these problems personally by taking direct action. Needless to say, the
fact that Horn’s style in premiership has very often been labelled by his first name