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86 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES<br />

possibly otherwise, and since the principle of this possibility<br />

is matter and not their form, which in fact determines<br />

the possibility of matter to one ;<br />

it follows that those things<br />

which are distinct by their forms are not distinct by chance,<br />

but perhaps those things are, whose distinction is from<br />

matter. But the distinction of species is from the form,<br />

and the distinction of singulars in the same species, is<br />

from matter. Wherefore the specific distinction of things<br />

cannot be from chance, but perhaps chance causes the<br />

distinction of certain individuals.<br />

Also. Since matter is the principle and cause of casual<br />

things, as we have shown, there may be chance in the<br />

making of things produced from matter. But it was proved<br />

above^ that the first production of things into being was<br />

not from matter. Wherefore there is no place for chance<br />

in them. Yet the first production of things must needs<br />

have included their distinction : since there are many<br />

created things which are neither produced from one<br />

another, nor from something common, because they do<br />

not agree in matter. Therefore it is impossible for the<br />

distinction of things to be from chance.<br />

Again. A per se cause is before an accidental cause.<br />

Hence if later things are from a determinate fer se cause,<br />

it is unfitting to say that the first things are from an<br />

undeterminate accidental cause. Now the distinction of<br />

things naturally precedes their movements and operations :<br />

since determinate movements and operations belong to<br />

things determinate and distinct. But movements and<br />

operations of things are from per se and determinate<br />

causes, since we find that they proceed from their causes in<br />

the same way either always or for the most part. Therefore<br />

the distinction of things is also from a per se determinate<br />

cause, and not from chance, which is an indeterminate<br />

accidental cause.<br />

Moreover. The form of anything that proceeds from an<br />

intellectual voluntary agent is intended by the agent. Now<br />

author God Who is an<br />

the universe of creatures has for its<br />

1<br />

Ch. xvi.

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