summa-contra-gentiles

i64
THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
whereby the soul knows and understands. Therefore preparedness
is not the possible intellect.
If, however, it be said that the principle of the aforesaid
operation in us is the intelligible species made actual by
the active intellect : this is
seemingly insufficient. For,
since man from being intentionally understanding
is made
actually understanding, it follows that not only does he
understand by the intelligible species, by which he is made
to understand actually, but also by an intellective power,
which is the principle of the aforesaid operation, as happens
also with the senses. Now Aristotle affirms that this power
is the possible intellect. Therefore the possible intellect is
independent of the body.
Further. The species is not actually intelligible except
in so far as it is
expurgated of material being. But this
cannot happen so long as it is in a material potentiality,
which namely
is caused from material principles, or is the
act of a material organ. Therefore must it be granted that
we have in ourselves an intellective power which is immaterial.
Again. The possible intellect is described by Aristotle^
as being part of the soul. Now the soul is not a preparedness
but an act, since preparedness is the order of potentiality
to act. And yet act is followed by a certain preparedness
to a further act, for instance the act of transparency is
followed by an order to the act of light. Therefore the
possible intellect is not a mere preparedness,
but is an act.
Moreover. Man obtains species and human nature
according to that part of the soul which is proper to him,
namely the possible intellect.^ Now nothing obtains species
and nature according as it is in potentiality, but according
as it is in act. Since then preparedness
is
nothing more
than order of potentiality to act, it is impossible
possible intellect be merely a certain preparedness
nature.
that the
in human
*
3 Dtf Anima iv. i.
" Ch. Ix.