summa-contra-gentiles
Summa
Summa
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CHAPTER LVIII<br />
the sensitive, as potentiality is subordinate to act : for the<br />
i43<br />
intellect comes after the sensitive, and the sensitive after<br />
the nutritive in the order of generation since in generation<br />
;<br />
an animal is made before a man. if<br />
Consequently this<br />
order makes the aforesaid predications to be per se, this<br />
will<br />
not be taking per se in the sense that arises from the<br />
form, but in that which arises from matter and subject, as<br />
a superficies is said to be coloured.^ But this is impossible.<br />
Because when we use per se in this sense, that which is<br />
formal is predicated per se of the subject, as when we say :<br />
The superficies is white or The number is even. Again<br />
when we use per se in this way, the subject is placed in the<br />
definition of the predicate, as number in the definition of<br />
even. But here the <strong>contra</strong>ry happens<br />
: because man is not<br />
predicated of animal per se, but <strong>contra</strong>riwise : and again<br />
the subject is not placed in the definition of the predicate,<br />
but vice versa. Therefore the aforesaid definitions are not<br />
made per se by reason of the order in question.<br />
Further. A thing has unity, from the same cause as it<br />
has being; for one is consequent upon being. Since then<br />
a thing has being from its form, it w^ll have unity also<br />
from its form. Consequently we if say that there are in<br />
man three souls, as different forms, man will not be one<br />
but several. Nor will the order of forms suffice for<br />
being<br />
the unity of man :<br />
because to be one with respect to order<br />
is not to be one simply ;<br />
since unity of order is the least of<br />
unities.<br />
Again. The aforesaid^ difficulty will again arise, namely<br />
that from the intellective soul and the body there results<br />
one thing not simply but only accidentally. For whatever<br />
accrues to a thing after its<br />
complete being, accrues thereto<br />
accidentally, since it is outside its essence. Now every<br />
substantial form makes a complete being in the genus of<br />
substance, for it makes an actual being and this particular<br />
thing. Consequently whatever accrues to a thing<br />
first substantial form, will accrue to it accidentally.<br />
after its<br />
Hence,<br />
since the nutritive soul is a substantial form,— for living is<br />
1<br />
C. I Poster, iv. 4.<br />
« Ch. Ivii.