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CHAPTER LVIII<br />

the sensitive, as potentiality is subordinate to act : for the<br />

i43<br />

intellect comes after the sensitive, and the sensitive after<br />

the nutritive in the order of generation since in generation<br />

;<br />

an animal is made before a man. if<br />

Consequently this<br />

order makes the aforesaid predications to be per se, this<br />

will<br />

not be taking per se in the sense that arises from the<br />

form, but in that which arises from matter and subject, as<br />

a superficies is said to be coloured.^ But this is impossible.<br />

Because when we use per se in this sense, that which is<br />

formal is predicated per se of the subject, as when we say :<br />

The superficies is white or The number is even. Again<br />

when we use per se in this way, the subject is placed in the<br />

definition of the predicate, as number in the definition of<br />

even. But here the <strong>contra</strong>ry happens<br />

: because man is not<br />

predicated of animal per se, but <strong>contra</strong>riwise : and again<br />

the subject is not placed in the definition of the predicate,<br />

but vice versa. Therefore the aforesaid definitions are not<br />

made per se by reason of the order in question.<br />

Further. A thing has unity, from the same cause as it<br />

has being; for one is consequent upon being. Since then<br />

a thing has being from its form, it w^ll have unity also<br />

from its form. Consequently we if say that there are in<br />

man three souls, as different forms, man will not be one<br />

but several. Nor will the order of forms suffice for<br />

being<br />

the unity of man :<br />

because to be one with respect to order<br />

is not to be one simply ;<br />

since unity of order is the least of<br />

unities.<br />

Again. The aforesaid^ difficulty will again arise, namely<br />

that from the intellective soul and the body there results<br />

one thing not simply but only accidentally. For whatever<br />

accrues to a thing after its<br />

complete being, accrues thereto<br />

accidentally, since it is outside its essence. Now every<br />

substantial form makes a complete being in the genus of<br />

substance, for it makes an actual being and this particular<br />

thing. Consequently whatever accrues to a thing<br />

first substantial form, will accrue to it accidentally.<br />

after its<br />

Hence,<br />

since the nutritive soul is a substantial form,— for living is<br />

1<br />

C. I Poster, iv. 4.<br />

« Ch. Ivii.

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