summa-contra-gentiles

CHAPTER LXXIV 197
according to the mode of the recipient. Now the being of
the possible intellect is more stable than the being of
corporeal matter. Therefore, since forms that flow into
corporeal matter from the active intelligence are, according
to him, preserved in that matter, much more are they
preserved in the possible intellect.
Again. Intellective knowledge is more perfect than
sensitive. Wherefore, if there is something to preserve
things apprehended in sensitive knowledge, a fortiori will
this be the case in intellective knowledge.
Again. We find that when, in a lower order of powers,
various things belong to various powers, in a higher order
they belong to one thus the common sense apprehends
:
the objects sensed by all the proper senses. Hence to
apprehend and to preserve, which, in the sensitive part of
the soul, belong to different powers, must needs be united
in the highest power, namely the intellect.
Further. The active intelligence, according to him,
causes all scientific knowledge. Wherefore if to learn is
merely to be adapted to union with the active intelligence,
he who learns one science, does not learn that one more
than another :
which is clearly false.
It is also clear that this position
is in conflict with the
opinion of Aristotle, who says (3 De AnimaY that the
possible intellect is the abode of the species: which is the
same as to say that it is the store-house of intelligible
species, to use the words of Avicenna.
Again. He adds further on' that, when the possible
intellect acquires knowledge, it is capable of acting by
itself, although it understand not actually. Therefore it
needs not the influence of any higher agent.
He also says (8 Phys.y that before learning, man is in
essential potentiality to knowledge, and consequently needs
a mover by which to be reduced to actuality ; whereas after
he has already learnt, he needs no mover per se. Therefore
he does not need the influence of the active intellect.
He also says (3 De AnimaY that the phantasms are to
* iv. 4.
« Ibid., 6.
» iv. 6.
« vii. ;
viii. 3.