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CHAPTER XXX<br />

is not <strong>contra</strong>ry to the natural disposition of the movable<br />

subject, wherefore it is not a violent but a natural movement.<br />

It is the same in the alteration of lower bodies by<br />

the heavenly bodies : for there is a natural inclination in<br />

the lower bodies to receive the influence of the higher<br />

bodies. It is also thus in the generation of the elements :<br />

since the form to be introduced by generation is not <strong>contra</strong>ry<br />

to primary matter, which is the subject of generation,<br />

although it is <strong>contra</strong>ry to the form to be cast aside, because<br />

matter under a <strong>contra</strong>ry form is not the subject of generation.<br />

Accordingly<br />

it is clear from what we have said that<br />

the necessity resulting from an efficient cause depends, in<br />

some things, on the disposition of the agent alone, but in<br />

others on the disposition of both agent and patient. If then<br />

this disposition, by reason of which the effect follows of<br />

necessity, be absolutely necessary in both agent and patient,<br />

there will be absolute necessity in the efficient cause : as in<br />

those things which act necessarily and always. On the<br />

other hand, if it be not absolutely necessary but may be<br />

removed, no necessity will result from the efficient cause<br />

except on the supposition that both have the disposition<br />

required for action : as, for instance, in those things which<br />

are sometimes hindered in their operation either through<br />

defective power, or through the violence of a <strong>contra</strong>ry :<br />

wherefore they do not act always and necessarily, but in<br />

the majority of cases.<br />

From a final cause there results necessity in things in<br />

two ways. In one way, forasmuch as it is first in the<br />

intention of the agent. In this respect necessity results<br />

from the end in the same way as from the agent since the<br />

:<br />

agent acts in so far as it intends the end, both in natural and<br />

in voluntary actions. For in natural things, the intention<br />

of the end belongs to the agent according to the latter's<br />

form, whereby the end is becoming to it : wherefore the<br />

natural thing must needs tend to the end according to<br />

the virtue of its form : thus a heavy body tends towards the<br />

centre according to the measure of its gravity. And in<br />

voluntary matters, the will inclines to act for the sake of an<br />

6i

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