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CHAPTER XXXIX 87<br />

agent by His will and intellect, as proved above. ^<br />

Nor can<br />

there be any defect in His power, so that He fail of His<br />

intention : since His power is infinite, as was proved above.'<br />

It follows therefore that the form of the universe is intended<br />

and willed by God. Therefore it is not from chance : for<br />

we ascribe to chance those things which are beside the<br />

intention of the agent. Now the form of the universe<br />

consists in the distinction and order of its parts. Therefore<br />

the distinction of things<br />

is not from chance.<br />

Further. That which is<br />

good and best in the effect is<br />

and the best<br />

the end of its production. But the good<br />

in the universe consists in the mutual order of its parts,<br />

which is<br />

impossible without distinction : since by this<br />

order the universe is established as one whole, and this<br />

is its best. Therefore the order of the parts of the<br />

universe and their distinction is the end of the production<br />

of the universe. Therefore the distinction of things is not<br />

from chance.<br />

Holy Writ bears witness to this truth, as is clear from<br />

Gen. i. i, where after the words, In the beginning God<br />

God<br />

created heaven and earth, the text continues {verse 4),<br />

. . . divided the light from the darkness, and so on : so<br />

that not only the creation of things,<br />

but also their distinction<br />

is shown to be from God, and not from chance,<br />

but as the good and the best of the universe. Wherefore<br />

it is added (verse 31)<br />

: God sa-iV all the things that He<br />

had made, and they were very good.<br />

Hereby is excluded the opinion of the ancient natural<br />

philosophers who affirmed that there was only a material<br />

cause, and no other, from which all things were made by<br />

expansion and cohesion.^ For these are compelled to say<br />

that the distinction of things which we observe in the<br />

universe resulted, not from the intentional ordinance of one,<br />

but from the chance movement of matter.<br />

Likewise is excluded the opinion of Democritus and<br />

Leucippus,* who postulated an infinite number of material<br />

^ Chs. xxiii., xriv. *<br />

Bk. I., ch. xliii.<br />

» Cf. I Meiaph. iii., iv.<br />

«<br />

Cf. ibid.

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