summa-contra-gentiles

148 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
one thing from the possible intellect and the actually understood
form. .Consequently the possible intellect is united
to whomsoever the aforesaid understood form is united.
Now it is un ited, to us by means of the phantasm which is
a^Mod of_subject. of _that un derstood form j^jm oHji^th is
way
the possible intellect also is in touch with us.
But it is
easy to see that all this is nonsensical and
impossible^ For the one who understands is the one who
JhasJinteikct. And the thing understood is the thing whose
intelligible species is united to the intellect. Consequently
though the intelligible species united to the intellect is in
a man in some way,
it does not follow that the man is the
one who understands, but only that he is understood by
the separate intellect.
Further. The actually understood species is the form of
the possible intellect, as the visible species in act is the form
of the visual power, or of the eye itself. Now the understood
species
is
compared to the phantasm as the visible
species in act is compared to the coloured object outside the
soul : in fact he uses this comparison himself, as also does
Aristotle.^ Therefore by the intelligible form the possible
Jniellect^.iji in touch with_|;he^^hantasm w^^ us^ in
the same way as th e visual power with ^he colou r that is n i
jthe stone. But this contact does not makejlhe stone to see
but to be seen. Therefore also the aforesaid contact of the
possible intellect with us, does not make us to understand,
but only to be understood. Now it is clear that it is properly
and truly said that man understands, for we would not
i nquire nto i the nature of the intellect except for thejact
that we understand ourselves. Therefore the aforesaid
manner of contact is not sufficient.
Again. Every knower by its cognitive power
is united
to its object, and not vice versa, just as every operator by
its operative power is united to the thing operated. Now
man is
intelligent by his intellect as by his cognitive power.
Therefore he is not united to the intellect by the intelligible
form, but by the intellect he is united to the intelligible.
^
3
De Anima v. i.