summa-contra-gentiles

CHAPTER LXX 177
should contain some fart of the body. But this seems
impossible. For it is difficult to conceive what part the
intellect contains and how.
It is also evident, since the intellect is not the act of any
part of the body, that its receptiveness is not that of
primary matter forasmuch as : its receptiveness and operation
are altogether without a corporeal organ.
Nor again
is the infinite power of the intellect excluded,
since its
power is not ascribed to a magnitude, but is
founded on the intellectual substance, as stated.
CHAPTER LXX
THAT ACCORDING TO THE WORDS OF ARISTOTLE VTE MUST
SAY THAT THE INTELLECT IS UNITED TO THE BODY AS
ITS FORM
Now, since Averroes endeavours to confirm his opinion
especially by appealing to the words and proof of Aristotle,*
"--it^remains to be shown that according to Aristotle's opinion
I
we must say that the intellect as to its substance is united
to a body as its form .
For Aristotle in the Eighth Book of Physics^ proves that
on to
in movers and things moved it is impossible to go
infinity. Whence he concludes that we must needs come
to some first moved thing, which either is moved by an
immovable mover, or moves itself. Of these two he takes
the latter, namely that the first movable moves itself, for
this reason, that what is per se always precedes that which
is
by another. Then he shows that a self-mover is of
necessity divided into two parts, one of which is mover and
the other moved. Consequently the first self-mover must
consist of two parts, the one moving, the other moved.
Now every such thing is animate.' Wherefore the first
movable, namely the heaven, is animate according
to the
opinion of Aristotle. Hence in 2 De Coelo* it is expressly
^ Cf. ch. lix. « V. See above, Bk. I., ch. xiii.
*
Cf.2 De Caelo il 3.
* Ibid. 6.