summa-contra-gentiles

CHAPTER XL 89
agent. This is proved thus. The its
agent produces like
according to its form, and if sometimes this fails, it is from
chance on account of a defect in the matter. Therefore
forms do not result from a disposition of matter as their
first cause ;
on the contrary, matters are disposed in such a
way that such may be their forms. Now the specific distinction
of things is according to their forms. Therefore
the distinction of things is not on account of the diversity
of matter as its first cause.
Moreover. The distinction of things cannot result from
matter except in those which are made from pre-existing
matter. Now many things are distinguished from one
another which cannot be made from pre-existing matter :
for instance, the celestial bodies, which have no contrary,
as their movement shows. Therefore the diversity of matter
as it
cannot be the first cause of the distinction of things.
Again. Whatever things having a cause of their being
are distinct from one another, have a cause of their distinction
: because a thing
is made a being according
is made one, undivided in itself and distinct from others.
Now if matter, by its diversity,
is the cause of the distinction
of things, we must suppose that matters are in themselves
distinct. Moreover it is evident that every matter
has being from something else, since it was proved above^
that everything, that is in any way whatsoever, is from
God. Therefore something else is the cause of distinction
in matters : and consequently the first cause of the distinction
of things cannot be a diversity of matter.
Again. Since every intellect acts for the sake of good, it
does not produce a better thing for the sake of an inferior
thing and : it is the same with nature. Now all things
proceed from God Who acts by His intellect, as stated
above.^ Therefore inferior things proceed from God for the
sake of better things, and not vice versa. But form is more
noble than matter, since it is its perfection and act. Therefore
He does not produce such and such forms for the sake
of such and such matters, but rather He produced such and
* Ch. XV. « Ch. xxiv.