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its<br />

CHAPTER XCVIII 295<br />

proper specific nature, but only as regards the common<br />

nature of their genus.<br />

Accordingly some^ say that one separate substance is the<br />

efficient cause of another. Now in every efficient cause<br />

there must be the image of its effect, and likewise in every<br />

effect there must be the likeness of its cause : because every<br />

agent produces its like. Hence in the higher separate<br />

substance there exists the likeness of the lower, as in the<br />

cause there is the likeness of its effect; while in the lower<br />

there is the likeness of the higher, as in the efifect there is<br />

the likeness of its cause. Now if we consider non-univocal<br />

causes, the likeness of the effect exists in the cause in a more<br />

eminent manner, and the likeness of the cause is in its effect<br />

in a less eminent manner. And the higher separate substances<br />

must needs be causes of this kind with respect to<br />

the lower separate substances : because they are placed in<br />

various degrees which are not of one species. Therefore a<br />

lower separate substance knows a higher according to the<br />

mode of the substance knowing, and not according to the<br />

mode of the substance known, but in a lower manner :<br />

whereas the higher knows the lower in a more eminent way.<br />

This is the meaning of the statement in De Causis,^ that an<br />

intelligence kno'v:s ivhat is below it, and what is above it,<br />

according to the mode of its substance : because the one is<br />

the cause of the other.<br />

But since we have shown above^ that intellectual separate<br />

substances are not composed of matter and form, they<br />

cannot be caused except by way of creation. Now to<br />

create belongs to God alone, as we proved above.* Therefore<br />

one separate substance cannot be the cause of another.<br />

Further. It has been proved^ that the principal parts of<br />

the universe are all created immediately by God. Therefore<br />

one of them is not caused by another. Now each of the<br />

separate substances is a principal part of the universe, much<br />

more than the sun or moon : since each of them has its<br />

proper species, which is<br />

also more noble than any species<br />

* Avicenna, Meiaph., tract ix. 4.<br />

* § vii.<br />

« Chs. l.,Ii. * Ch. ni. » Ch. xlii.

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