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CHAPTER XXXIII 69<br />

which has no <strong>contra</strong>ry. Therefore it is impossible for<br />

certain creatures not to exist : and consequently<br />

it is<br />

necessary that they exist always.<br />

Again. A thing's endurance in being is in proportion<br />

to its<br />

power of being, except accidentally, as in those which<br />

are corrupted by violence. But there are certain creatures<br />

in which there is a power of being not for any definite time,<br />

but for ever ;<br />

for instance Hke heavenly bodies and intellectual<br />

substances, because they are incorruptible through<br />

having no <strong>contra</strong>ry. It foTTows, then, that it is<br />

competent<br />

to them to be always. But that which begins to exist, is<br />

not always. Therefore it is not becoming to them that they<br />

begin to exist.<br />

Further. Whenever a thing begins to be moved anew,<br />

the mover, or the moved, or both, must be conditioned<br />

otherwise now while the movement is, than before when<br />

there was no movement : for there is a certain habitude or<br />

relation in the mover to the thing moved, for as much as it<br />

moves actually ;<br />

and the new relation does not begin without<br />

a change either in both or at least in one or other of the<br />

extremes. Now that which is conditioned otherwise now<br />

and heretofore, is moved. ^<br />

Therefore, before the movement<br />

that begins anew, there must be a previous movement either<br />

in the movable or in the mover. It follows, in consequence,<br />

that every movement is either eternal, or has another movement<br />

preceding<br />

it. Therefore movement always has been ;<br />

and consequently movable also. Therefore there have<br />

always been creatures : since God is utterly immovable, as<br />

we proved in the First Book.^<br />

Further. Every agent that engenders its like, intends to<br />

preserve perpetual being in the species,<br />

for it cannot be<br />

preserved perpetually in the individual. But it is impossible<br />

for the desire of nature to be frustrated. Therefore it<br />

follows that the species of generable things are everlasting.<br />

Again. If time is everlasting, movement must be everlasting,<br />

since it is the reckoning of movement:^ and consequently<br />

movables must be everlasting,<br />

since movement is<br />

1 5 Phys. i. 7.<br />

« Ch. xiu. »<br />

4 Phys. xi.

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