summa-contra-gentiles

CHAPTER XXIII 41
Again. The first action belongs to the first agent, as the
first movement to the first movable. Now, the action of
the will naturally precedes the action of nature : because
the more perfect is naturally first, although in some particular
thing it may be last in time. Now the action of a
voluntary agent is more perfect a proof of which is that
:
are more perfect than
among us agents which act by will
those which act by natural necessity. Therefore to God,
Who is the first agent, that action is due which is by
the will.
Further. The same is evident from the fact that where
both actions are united, the power which acts by will is
above that which acts by nature, and uses the latter as an
instrument :
for in man the intellect which acts by
the will
is
higher than the vegetative soul which acts by a necessity
of its nature. Now the divine power is above all beings.
Therefore it acts on all things by will, not by natural
necessity.
Again. The will has for its object a good considered as
a good : whereas nature does not compass the idea of good
in general, but the particular good which is its perfection.
Since, then, every agent acts for as much as it intends a
good, because the end moves the it
agent, follows that the
agent by will is compared to the agent by natural necessity
as a universal to a particular agent. Now the particular
agent is compared to the universal agent, as posterior
thereto, and as its instrument. Therefore the first
agent
must be voluntary and not an agent by natural necessitv.
Divine Scripture teaches us this truth. For it is said in
the psalm :^ Whatsoever the Lord pleased He hath done,
and (Eph.
i. 11) Who worketh : all things according to the
counsel of His ivill.
Hilary also in his book De :
Synodis^ says God's will
gave substance to all creatures. And further on : All
things were created such as God willed them to be.
Hereby also is refuted the error of certain philosophers
who asserted that God works by natural necessity.
1 Ps. cxxxiv. 6. » No. 58.