Revista Tinerilor Economiºti (The Young Economists Journal)

Revista Tinerilor Economişti (The Young Economists Journal)
On the philosophical-political part we can mention the directions impressed
to public policies by classical contractualist theories: from Hobbes, Locke (classical
ideological liberalism) to the modern supporters of institutionalism based on the
theories of the constitutional law (Kelsen). On the other part, public policies should
observe the rights both negative and positive of the individuals: the right to live, the
right to own a property, the right to freedom or the right of free speaking, the right of
free enterprise, and freedom of association, etc.
3.3. Public politics – towards the ethics of resources grant
The resources grant within public politics is rather a problem of the modern
politics and might be generally stated as the difficulty of the preferences aggregation.
This theory proved by K. Arrow shows that it is impossible in a democratic society for
the deciders to observe the conditions of the decision rational-comprehensive theory.
Arrow shows that the choices that certain members of a democratic society –
considered as rational – make, cannot be aggregated so that a collective decision should
be taken, the one that should be the best for all. This limit might be operationalised and
analysed as Arrow’s theory of impossibility starting from a strictly theoretical situation.
We suppose that three persons, A, B, C belong to a commission that should
decide over a public policy. But the persons A, B, C have different points of view
related to the best applicable policy. If there is a hierarchy of solutions as follows: A: a
> b > c, B: b > c > a, C: c > a > b, we can first notice that the individual preferences of
the group members are all transitive. If an aggregation of the three preferences is tried
in order to obtain a social preference (of the deciders group) by comparing the
alternatives two by two then, if one is preferred to the other one by two members of the
commission, that would be the chosen alternative. If it is supposed that within the
commission the choices are made according to the majority, we have the following
relationships: a > b (as both A and C prefer a instead of b). The group’s preference will
be the following: a > b > c > a. the social preference is not transitive, because although
a > b and b > c, it does not appear, as it is expected according to the transitivity
characteristic a > c, but c > a. The relationship of social preference is periodical. “The
social preference does not allow a choice to be made in a simple or simplistic way”. 43
4. Conclusions
Choosing a good public policy can lead to ethical or moral dilemmas when it
is conditioned by multiple, competing or desirable (incommensurable) values as
freedom, equality, justice, equity, efficiency. The limits of preferences aggregation do
not show that we are not able to make rational assessments, adequate ranking but they
are difficult to attain.
There is no algorithm (meaning a finite, objective, universally valid
technique) to compare according to more criteria, needs, interests, priorities, products,
decisions or policies. It is up to the politician’s assessment, more or less subjective
related to the priorities, to the main public interest, to the most pressing needs. The
ethical vein should not disappear even if sometimes the decider must chose between an
additional point of justice and freedom, between equity and justice, between truth and
justice, etc. The lack of ethics or its elusion in the area of public policies can be a
43
Adrian Miroiu, Introducere în analiza politicilor publice, Bucureşti, 2001,
http://www.spidd.ro/carti/analiza%20politicilorpublice.pdf, accessed at 27.10.2010.
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