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equity implications of health sector user fees in tanzania

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II LITERATURE REVIEW<br />

2.1 Introduction to the overall <strong>user</strong> fee debate<br />

Background<br />

The <strong>user</strong> fee debate is full <strong>of</strong> controversies. The alleged positive and negative impacts <strong>of</strong> <strong>user</strong> <strong>fees</strong> on<br />

efficiency, <strong>equity</strong>, quality and susta<strong>in</strong>ability have led to heated debates among <strong>health</strong> <strong>sector</strong><br />

stakeholders. Almost without exception, the donor community strongly supported the cost-shar<strong>in</strong>g<br />

approach to education and <strong>health</strong> progressively <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong> the 1980s and 1990s. The IMF and WB<br />

have traditionally promoted <strong>user</strong> <strong>fees</strong>, although their <strong>of</strong>ficial policy is more careful nowadays. They<br />

considered charges at the po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>of</strong> use needed to deter frivolous use and to help br<strong>in</strong>g money <strong>in</strong>to<br />

cash-strapped <strong>health</strong> systems (Rowson, 2004). Toward the late 1990s, however, other donors started<br />

to change their position regard<strong>in</strong>g the desirability <strong>of</strong> <strong>user</strong> <strong>fees</strong>. This trend is confirmed by Bennet and<br />

Gilson (2001) and the WHO World Health Report 2000. They conclude that “the focus <strong>of</strong> the<br />

<strong>in</strong>ternational debate is on the need to move away from excessive reliance on out-<strong>of</strong>-pocket payment<br />

as a source <strong>of</strong> <strong>health</strong> f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g towards a system which <strong>in</strong>corporates a greater element <strong>of</strong> risk pool<strong>in</strong>g<br />

(for example, through <strong>health</strong> <strong>in</strong>surance) and thus affords greater protection for the poor.<br />

Commonly used systems<br />

Health care systems, particularly those <strong>in</strong> develop<strong>in</strong>g countries, typically depend on a mix <strong>of</strong> f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g<br />

mechanisms rather than only one. The pr<strong>in</strong>cipal mechanisms are: (1) tax-based f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g, (2) social<br />

<strong>in</strong>surance f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g, (3) private <strong>in</strong>surance, (4) <strong>user</strong> <strong>fees</strong> and (5) community-based <strong>health</strong> <strong>in</strong>surance. It<br />

is common for different population segments to be covered by different types <strong>of</strong> f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g mechanism.<br />

The degree to which the f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g system as a whole is pro-poor depends on how the different<br />

mechanisms <strong>in</strong>teract (Bennet & Gilson, 2001). Two broad models <strong>of</strong> <strong>user</strong> fee systems have been<br />

adopted <strong>in</strong> African countries: (1) the ‘standard model’ and (2) the ‘Bamako Initiative model’ (Nolan and<br />

Turbat, 1995; <strong>in</strong> Gilson, 1997) (See Technical Paper Part 1). There is a wide range <strong>of</strong> different types<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>user</strong> fee payment systems: flat fee or differentiated fee; fee per episode or fee per item <strong>of</strong> service;<br />

prepayment or payment at time <strong>of</strong> use (Price, 2002). In addition to formal <strong>user</strong> <strong>fees</strong>, <strong>in</strong>formal charges<br />

are common practice (Nyonator and Kutz<strong>in</strong>, 1999).<br />

The reviewed literature mentions several ma<strong>in</strong> and derivative objectives for <strong>in</strong>troduc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>user</strong> <strong>fees</strong> <strong>in</strong><br />

the <strong>health</strong> <strong>sector</strong>. They are classified (see table 2.1) <strong>in</strong> three ma<strong>in</strong> categories. 7<br />

Table 2.1: Objectives for <strong>in</strong>troduc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>user</strong> <strong>fees</strong> <strong>in</strong> the <strong>health</strong> <strong>sector</strong><br />

Enhanc<strong>in</strong>g<br />

efficiency<br />

Enhanc<strong>in</strong>g<br />

susta<strong>in</strong>ability<br />

Enhanc<strong>in</strong>g<br />

<strong>equity</strong><br />

� The <strong>in</strong>troduction <strong>of</strong> price signals through <strong>user</strong> <strong>fees</strong> can strengthen the appropriate use<br />

<strong>of</strong> the referral system by patients, facilitate the reallocation <strong>of</strong> resources to costeffective<br />

primary care, and rationalize utilization and ‘frivolous’ consumption <strong>of</strong> <strong>health</strong><br />

services.<br />

� Rais<strong>in</strong>g revenue to replace or supplement government funds is mentioned as the<br />

dom<strong>in</strong>ant objective. There is a desire for ‘system susta<strong>in</strong>ability’ (a broader concept<br />

than ‘f<strong>in</strong>ancial susta<strong>in</strong>ability’) as the underly<strong>in</strong>g rationale.<br />

� User <strong>fees</strong> can avoid the provision <strong>of</strong> subsidies to those who can afford to pay, and <strong>in</strong><br />

do<strong>in</strong>g so free up funds to pay all or part <strong>of</strong> the costs for those less or unable to pay. If<br />

resources generated through <strong>user</strong> <strong>fees</strong> are allocated to improve coverage and quality<br />

<strong>of</strong> care 8 , <strong>user</strong> <strong>fees</strong> are said to disproportionally benefit the poor by <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g their<br />

demand and utilization <strong>of</strong> <strong>health</strong> services.<br />

Source: Newbrander & Sacca, 1996; Gilson, 1997; Wilk<strong>in</strong>son et al, 2001; Bonu et al, 2002; Kivumbi &<br />

K<strong>in</strong>tu, 2002; IPAR, 2003; Price, 2002; Bijlmakers, 2003; Ridde, 2003.<br />

2.2 Documented <strong>implications</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>user</strong> <strong>fees</strong><br />

The study team identified the most relevant documented evidence on the <strong>implications</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>user</strong> <strong>fees</strong>. For<br />

more background <strong>in</strong>formation the Addis Ababa Consensus on Pr<strong>in</strong>ciples on Cost Shar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Education<br />

7 Some authors mention enhanc<strong>in</strong>g quality as an additional objective. In our view, however, it is more appropriate<br />

to consider improved quality as be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>strumental to enhanc<strong>in</strong>g susta<strong>in</strong>ability, efficiency and most notably <strong>equity</strong>.<br />

We therefore do not mention it separately (see also Bijlmakers, 2003).<br />

8 The reviewed literature mentions different strategies for such quality improvement: either directly or <strong>in</strong>directly<br />

aimed at <strong>health</strong> services. Kipp et al (2001) report on the implementation <strong>of</strong> <strong>user</strong> <strong>fees</strong> as a staff <strong>in</strong>centive system<br />

(i.e. top up low salaries), which led <strong>health</strong> workers to <strong>of</strong>fer improved services. They note that they found no other<br />

published <strong>in</strong>formation on us<strong>in</strong>g cost-shar<strong>in</strong>g revenues <strong>in</strong> such a way.<br />

Equity Implications <strong>of</strong> Health Sector User Fees <strong>in</strong> Tanzania 3

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