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equity implications of health sector user fees in tanzania

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persons suggested to design a policy that ensures that poor people are not priced out <strong>of</strong> the <strong>health</strong><br />

care system, comb<strong>in</strong>ed with a policy to allocate more funds to a basic package <strong>of</strong> quality <strong>health</strong><br />

services that can be accessed by especially the poor.<br />

In relation to the next PRS, the respondents were <strong>of</strong> the op<strong>in</strong>ion that the position that <strong>user</strong> <strong>fees</strong>, CHF<br />

and alternative complementary f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g mechanisms should be taken on board and should be<br />

effectively strengthened as part <strong>of</strong> the long-term strategy <strong>of</strong> us<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>health</strong> <strong>sector</strong> as a tool to fight<br />

poverty. Mechanisms should be designed to ensure that the next PRS is implemented <strong>in</strong> a selective<br />

manner, mean<strong>in</strong>g that those who are able to pay do so and those unable to pay are actually<br />

exempted. The respondents did not f<strong>in</strong>d the achievements <strong>of</strong> the PRS over the last three years<br />

encourag<strong>in</strong>g, particularly <strong>in</strong> relation to <strong>health</strong>. In their op<strong>in</strong>ion, the <strong>health</strong> chapter had not been<br />

adequately ma<strong>in</strong>streamed <strong>in</strong> the PRS process. It was felt that the government commitment to<br />

f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>health</strong> services is proportionally decl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g as compared to donor fund<strong>in</strong>g, which is <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

More <strong>in</strong> general, the PRS is largely donor-driven around specific project and programmes, which are<br />

unfortunately not properly coord<strong>in</strong>ated.<br />

6.7 Lesson learned and policy recommendations from literature review<br />

6.7.1 User fee systems<br />

General key lessons<br />

Over the past years, authors have summarized the lessons learned from the implementation <strong>of</strong> <strong>user</strong><br />

fee systems and various safety nets. The recommendations predom<strong>in</strong>antly relate to strengthen<strong>in</strong>g<br />

exist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>user</strong> fee systems. The study team has <strong>in</strong>cluded detailed overviews <strong>of</strong> reference material <strong>in</strong> the<br />

Technical Paper (Part 5). Bennet and Gilson (2001) have identified the follow<strong>in</strong>g key lessons;<br />

� It does not make sense to assess whether or not a s<strong>in</strong>gle f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g mechanism is pro-poor; such<br />

an assessment must be carried out with respect to the complete mix <strong>of</strong> f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g mechanisms and<br />

their <strong>in</strong>teraction with resource allocation approaches and organisational contexts.<br />

� User <strong>fees</strong> and community-based <strong>health</strong> <strong>in</strong>surance are unlikely to be equitable or susta<strong>in</strong>able if<br />

they are the prime source <strong>of</strong> <strong>health</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ance. In order to protect the <strong>in</strong>terests <strong>of</strong> the poor they<br />

should be viewed only as a means to ‘top-up’ other f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g systems (such as tax revenues and<br />

social <strong>health</strong> <strong>in</strong>surance).<br />

� Although a f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g system may <strong>in</strong> design be pro-poor, it is important to th<strong>in</strong>k about whether or<br />

not it is feasible to implement this design. In practice political pressures may prevent shifts <strong>in</strong><br />

resource allocations to the poor, and limited government capacity may h<strong>in</strong>der the effective<br />

implementation <strong>of</strong> exemption schemes to protect the poor, or may prevent the promised ga<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong><br />

quality <strong>of</strong> care from actually materializ<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

� Poor people’s access to <strong>health</strong> care is <strong>of</strong>ten constra<strong>in</strong>ed by low quality care, high transport costs,<br />

long wait<strong>in</strong>g times and <strong>in</strong>convenient open<strong>in</strong>g hours. F<strong>in</strong>ancial reforms, which deliver improvements<br />

<strong>in</strong> these dimensions <strong>of</strong> quality at a moderate price, particularly <strong>in</strong> relation to hospital care, will<br />

probably benefit the poor.<br />

� The effective development and implementation <strong>of</strong> pro-poor f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g policies is never a once-only<br />

action, but always the result <strong>of</strong> a susta<strong>in</strong>ed approach that allows adaptation over time <strong>in</strong> response<br />

to experience and chang<strong>in</strong>g circumstances. With<strong>in</strong> such an approach, it is essential that as much<br />

attention is given to strategies that build and ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> support for the policies over time, as to<br />

technical adaptations <strong>of</strong> policy design.<br />

Inventory <strong>of</strong> lessons learned: four core sets.<br />

In 1997, Gilson identified four core sets <strong>of</strong> lessons learned (see for the elaborate version Technical<br />

Paper Part 5). They are still valid s<strong>in</strong>ce other authors confirm this set and come up with similar<br />

recommendations (also <strong>in</strong> more recent publications) (see e.g. Kipp et al, 2001; Nyonator & Kutz<strong>in</strong>,<br />

1999; Newbrander & Sacca, 1996; Bennet & Gilson, 2001). Key questions and ma<strong>in</strong> lessons learned<br />

are:<br />

1. What are key bottlenecks to the effective implementation <strong>of</strong> <strong>user</strong> <strong>fees</strong> and safety nets? (1) Weak<br />

design <strong>of</strong> <strong>user</strong> fee systems, (2) weak capacity for local level f<strong>in</strong>ancial management and fee system<br />

implementation, (3) weak support<strong>in</strong>g systems, and (4) contextual constra<strong>in</strong>ts.<br />

2. Where and when to implement <strong>user</strong> <strong>fees</strong>? (1) Fee implementation should focus on the hospital<br />

level and should be associated with risk-shar<strong>in</strong>g mechanisms and exemptions, and (2) <strong>fees</strong> should<br />

Equity Implications <strong>of</strong> Health Sector User Fees <strong>in</strong> Tanzania 31

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