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equity implications of health sector user fees in tanzania

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have been highlighted <strong>in</strong> Technical Paper Part 1 and <strong>in</strong>cludes; (1) utilization and exclusion, (2)<br />

regressive outcomes <strong>of</strong> <strong>user</strong> <strong>fees</strong> on specific groups, (3) trade-<strong>of</strong>fs at household level, (4) nature <strong>of</strong><br />

payment scheme, (5) barriers other then <strong>user</strong> <strong>fees</strong>, (6) safety nets, (7) quality, (8) potential <strong>of</strong> <strong>fees</strong> at<br />

primary level, (9) adequacy <strong>of</strong> revenue generated, (10) management, (11) transparency and (12)<br />

community <strong>in</strong>volvement.<br />

2.3 Documentation on exemption and waiver systems<br />

Exemptions and waivers are so-called ‘safety nets’ which aim to protect the vulnerable and poor from<br />

the adverse impact <strong>of</strong> <strong>user</strong> <strong>fees</strong>. Most <strong>of</strong> the reviewed literature expresses a strong concern that<br />

safety nets tend to protect the poor <strong>in</strong>sufficiently from the adverse impacts <strong>of</strong> <strong>user</strong> <strong>fees</strong>. Case studies<br />

<strong>in</strong> Kenya <strong>in</strong>dicate that <strong>in</strong> 1999 waivers rarely exceeded 2 persons per month while 42% <strong>of</strong> the<br />

population was liv<strong>in</strong>g below the poverty l<strong>in</strong>e. It was also found that 80% <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>patients and 86% <strong>of</strong><br />

outpatients were not aware <strong>of</strong> waivers and exemptions (Ow<strong>in</strong>o, 1998 and 1999). Evidence from other<br />

studies <strong>in</strong>dicates both leakage <strong>of</strong> benefits to <strong>in</strong>eligible households and <strong>in</strong>adequate support to the<br />

primary <strong>in</strong>tended beneficiaries (under coverage). This is <strong>of</strong>ten related to the existence <strong>of</strong> complex,<br />

unworkable and <strong>in</strong>consistent exemption mechanisms that require too much <strong>in</strong>formation and are<br />

therefore costly to adm<strong>in</strong>ister; lack <strong>of</strong> public fund<strong>in</strong>g to pay for waivers and exemptions; the lack <strong>of</strong><br />

guidance on f<strong>in</strong>ancial management and control practices; and weak adm<strong>in</strong>istrative systems. Income<br />

criteria as a reason for a waiver are difficult to apply s<strong>in</strong>ce many poor people work <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>formal<br />

<strong>sector</strong> while <strong>fees</strong> and <strong>in</strong>come eligibility thresholds are not adjusted to chang<strong>in</strong>g circumstances<br />

(Newbrander & Sacca, 1996; Gilson, 1997; Ow<strong>in</strong>o, 1998; Price, 2002; Kivumbi & K<strong>in</strong>tu, 2002, IPAR,<br />

2003; Bitran et al, 2003).<br />

Accord<strong>in</strong>g to UNICEF and Bitran (2003), the performance <strong>of</strong> exemption and waiver systems is seldom<br />

evaluated. This is considered as a major weakness as the consequences cannot be assessed and<br />

policies cannot be adjusted. Ma<strong>in</strong> constra<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>in</strong>clude; (1) exemption schemes are implemented <strong>in</strong><br />

<strong>in</strong>formal and ad hoc ways; (2) exemptions based on the ability to pay are extremely uncommon <strong>in</strong><br />

practice; (3) decisions to exempt are <strong>of</strong>ten left to the discretion <strong>of</strong> local service providers; (4) absence<br />

<strong>of</strong> specialized staff hampers the effectiveness <strong>of</strong> the waiver procedure; (5) there can be a negative<br />

attitude <strong>of</strong> <strong>health</strong> staff towards policies for protect<strong>in</strong>g the poor as waivers mean less <strong>in</strong>come and more<br />

work; (6) the distribution <strong>of</strong> cards for a waiver or exemption are <strong>of</strong>ten cumbersome and lead to high<br />

adm<strong>in</strong>istrative costs, delay and retention <strong>of</strong> cards, (7) f<strong>in</strong>ancial <strong>in</strong>centives or staff performance are<br />

l<strong>in</strong>ked to successfully collect<strong>in</strong>g <strong>fees</strong>; (8) the characteristics <strong>of</strong> the poor are generally not def<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> a<br />

clear fashion. The lack <strong>of</strong> clear identification criteria seems to be a major problem; (9) poor people do<br />

not know about exemptions or do not bother because <strong>of</strong> adm<strong>in</strong>istrative barriers; and (10) exemption<br />

schemes can be stigmatis<strong>in</strong>g and dehumanis<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

Positive experiences that improved <strong>equity</strong> allocations <strong>of</strong> <strong>health</strong> services for poor people were found <strong>in</strong><br />

Cambodja were an Equity Fund (EF) <strong>of</strong> the National Hospital f<strong>in</strong>anced the cost <strong>of</strong> <strong>health</strong> services<br />

(consultation and medic<strong>in</strong>es) at no charge or reduced prices to the poor. A key factor <strong>of</strong> the EF that<br />

was beneficial to the poor was the payment <strong>of</strong> <strong>health</strong> providers for the services delivered. This made<br />

<strong>health</strong> providers <strong>in</strong>different towards treat<strong>in</strong>g regularly pay<strong>in</strong>g patients and EF beneficiaries. Other best<br />

practises have been <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> Technical Paper Part 1.<br />

2.4 Documented f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs on Community Health Funds<br />

Community Health Funds and limited understand<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>teraction with other <strong>health</strong> care f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g<br />

schemes<br />

Community Health Funds (CHFs) are a form <strong>of</strong> community-based <strong>health</strong> <strong>in</strong>surance. Community Health<br />

Funds (CHFs) or Community-Based Health Insurance schemes (CBHI) are <strong>of</strong>ten mentioned as ‘the<br />

solution’ for the problems generated by <strong>user</strong> <strong>fees</strong>. CBHI schemes, where they have been operated<br />

successfully, have <strong>of</strong>fered benefits to the poor. However, the very poor require special arrangements<br />

to enable them to access benefits under the scheme (e.g. subsidies from government or higher<br />

<strong>in</strong>come scheme members); few schemes have effectively implemented these arrangements. A recent<br />

paper (Bennett 2004:147-157), emphasizes that there is actually very limited understand<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> how<br />

CBHI schemes <strong>in</strong>teract with other elements <strong>of</strong> a <strong>health</strong> care f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g scheme. S<strong>of</strong>ar there has only<br />

been marg<strong>in</strong>al analysis <strong>of</strong> the impact <strong>of</strong> the CBHI scheme on the population at large and the possible<br />

effects <strong>of</strong> the schemes beyond their members. There are virtually no studies that have discussed<br />

CBHI schemes from a system-wide perspective. CBHI schemes cover a bewilder<strong>in</strong>g variety <strong>of</strong> benefit<br />

Equity Implications <strong>of</strong> Health Sector User Fees <strong>in</strong> Tanzania 5

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