Økonomisk Kriminalitet Nordiske Perspektiver - Scandinavian ...

Braithwaite, 1993). This model has the benefits to decrease reoffending through
reintegrative shaming and the deterrent effect of more severe sanctions.
Finally in terms of regulation or supervision, this review has identified the need
for more co-operation between authorities, in addition to a need for an increase in
resources. Co-operation and division of tasks between regulatory agencies and the
prosecutor of economic crimes has been clarified in recent legislations, but still the
legislation is vague regarding the form of that co-operation (Althingi, nr. 55/2007).
The lack of co-operation was mentioned in my interviews with the former
employees of different authorities and attention drawn to the success of such cooperation
in Denmark and Norway for example. Close co-operation between
authorities was mentioned as the key to successful prosecution of economic crimes
in these countries.
In Finland the establishment of ‘Virke’ is an interesting example of the use of
classic crime prevention methods in the context of corporate crime prevention.
Virke is a development of corporate crime prevention partnerships, consisting of
representatives from different branches of administration who are acting in the
project within their administrative duties, with their authority and within their
own secrecy acts. The key focus of the project is upon gathering, analysing and use
of crime prevention information with the key purpose to facilitate and increase the
efficiency of operational economic crime prevention and investigation of the
police and co-operational authorities (Alvesalo, Tombs, Virta and Whyte, 2006).
In a small country like Iceland such a system has obvious benefits. The
resources are scarce and with closer co-operation would be put to more efficient
use 10
. Today there are two offices of prosecutors investigating economic crimes
separately and numerous authorities watching over different areas of the business
environment.
10 I deducted from my interviews with former employees of the FME and with members of the
Competition Authorities and Tax Authorities, that each had been trying to invent ways to analyse
the ownership of private companies in Iceland and to identify cross ownership, but so far none of
the agencies had shared their resources for this complicated task.
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