almanac on security sector oversight in the Western Balkans

1 . Introduction
The security sector reform and development in Kosovo is in its early, formative stages.
As this chapter will show, an entirely new security sector was built up from scratch and
with direct support from the international community within a relatively short period
of time. Because Kosovo security institutions have only been set up recently they have
not been able to fully take up all their functions. Considering the circumstances in
which the Kosovo security sector developed, any concrete assessment of local capacities
to implement public policies should not start until after the 2008 Declaration of
Independence. Only after this was the Kosovo security sector handed to locals. As a
result, for the first time in Kosovo’s history preconditions were created for establishing
civilian and democratic control of the security sector (KCSS, 2011).
Until the end of 2011, Kosovo institutions made significant progress in establishing
an institutional and legal infrastructure. The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo
explicitly refers to the security sector in chapter 11, defining separately all the roles of
main security institutions. The constitution also refers to the civilian and democratic
control of security institutions, the applicability of international agreements and the
role of the Kosovo Assembly (Constitution, 2008: Art. 125). There are also separate
laws and by-laws regulating the role of security institutions in detail. The authors of
this chapter have identified that in addition to laws which were adopted (mainly as
part of a comprehensive legislative package of the Ahtisaari Plan), there are other
laws adopted during the pre-independence period which need to be modified due to
conflicts with new laws (KCSS, 2012). For example, the laws on civil emergency management,
criminal procedural codes and other important laws which were previously
approved during the UNMIK period.
Good governance in the Kosovo security sector varies from one institution to another.
The Kosovo Police (KP) is much better in this respect compared to the Kosovo Security
Force (KSF), the Kosovo Intelligence Agency (KIA) and other security institutions. 55 In
terms of internal control, research shows most of these mechanisms are still developing.
Discrepancy among the development of internal control institutions might seem
reasonable since the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) and the Kosovo Intelligence Agency
(KIA) are new, so it is too early to have a complete picture of their progress. Deficiencies
in the procurement system could lead to potential misuse of public funds, a major
cause of which may be the use of single source tendering. In comparison, the situation
is slightly better in terms of protection of human rights and rights of employees.
It is also disputable whether other oversight mechanisms, such as relevant Kosovo
parliamentary committees and independent state institutions, are exercising their role
in a proper and effective manner. As argued throughout this chapter, the mandate of
the two parliamentary committees is limited and only exercised occasionally, making
oversight efforts insufficient. Finally, the justice system is relatively weak and has a
limited track record of scrutinising acts and potential deficiencies in the security sector.
55 Nevertheless, the reader should bear in mind the KSF and KIA were only recently established and are
therefore both in the process of consolidation.
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