almanac on security sector oversight in the Western Balkans

Albania
these units are not always fully staffed and there is high turnover of personnel, which
has weakened institutional memory and expertise. Turnover also has allowed recruitment
of staff based on political affiliations and sympathies, making the opposition
reluctant to rely on their support and expertise.
Another problem revealed by analysis of parliamentary documents and also interviews
is that there is no practical cooperation among the three parliamentary committees.
6.4. Independent oversight institutions
The most relevant bodies involved in intelligence oversight are the People’s Advocate
(PsA) and the State Supreme Audit Institution (SSAI).
The People’s Advocate’s mandate includes control of implementation of laws on
fundamental rights and freedoms by intelligence services (Constitution of Albania,
Art.60-63). The PsA institution has authority to access classified information, conduct
inspections of premises of intelligence services and to call on intelligence officials for
questioning (Law on the People’s Advocate 1999, Art.18-20). The number of complaints
and the scope of cases dealt with by PsA, however, have been limited. From
2001 to 2009 only sixty-five complaints have been administered by PsA. These were
mainly labour disputes between intelligence officers and the SIS (People’s Advocate of
Albania, 2001-2009). The MIS or other intelligence services have not been part of PsA
oversight activity.
As the highest institution for control of the spending of public funds the SSAI has the
authority to control implementation of the budget by intelligence services (Constitution
of Albania, Art.162-165). SSAI reports include findings and recommendations on
the SIS budget spending but specific data on the MIS are aggregated in the section
dedicated to the audit of the Ministry of Defence. One main issue regarding control
of spending of the budget by intelligence services is the audit of the funds used for
classified procurements or covert operations. According to the law, the SSAI should report
findings on this activity to the Committee on Economy and Finances (CEF) behind
closed doors (Law on the State Supreme Audit Institution 1997, Art.22), but this has
not been done due to lack of CEF resources to cover the full range of activities.
The other independent oversight bodies have restricted mandates for control of the
intelligence services. For example,the Commissioner for Personal Data Protection may
be excluded from controlling the intelligence services on national security grounds
while the Procurement Advocate is barred from access to classified procurements.
6.5. Judicial control and oversight
The judiciary controls intelligence services through the courts, but the number of cases
involving the intelligence services has been minimal. Only once, in 1999, was the
Constitutional Court called to interpret compliance with the constitution of the law
37
Almanac on Security Sector Oversight in the Western Balkans