almanac on security sector oversight in the Western Balkans

institutions financed by taxpayers (unless they are contracted by public institutions).
Statutory actors operate under a social contract with citizens and therefore have a
greater obligation to make information available on their functioning. Similarly, it
would be pointless to expect that citizens will participate in creating and implementing
the security policies of private security companies, as these are commercial nonstatutory
agencies. Moreover, under the actor-based model, applying oversight criteria
to oversight bodies themselves (e.g. parliament, the judiciary, the executive and
independent state authorities or CSOs) less accurately measures the primary goal of
SSR – effective control over security providers. Our research was interested in determining
whether oversight bodies perform their oversight role, rather than whether
or not they are under someone else’s oversight. The second justification for the shift
from an actor-based to a sectoral approach is that the sector-wide approach more
realistically captures the aim to provide human security as an outcome delivered to
individual citizens, irrespective of providers. Human security is reflected in feelings of
safety and trust that citizens perceive through the interplay of multiple institutions.
For example, the methodology no longer instructed researchers to assess separately
the quality of human rights protection by the police, military, intelligence services etc.,
but to assess one grade for the quality of human rights protection over of the entire
security sector. The improved methodology was inspired by a holistic approach to security
sector reform, which treats human and national security as equal goals of security
policy while acknowledging the contribution of both non-state and traditional
state actors in the implementation of these goals.
Data was still collected for each actor (as in previous research) and next aggregated
based on common trends, with an overall grade presented for each criterion. Data
aggregation was done according to a generic grading format, described in greater
detail below. While collecting and interpreting data, the researchers respected unique
features of actors at the level of individual indicators (for example, differentiating
between the desired levels of transparency among agencies with vastly different functions).
Additionally, differences in the depth and quality of oversight exercised over
specific institutions are explained in narratives which accompany grades. Within these
narratives, certain ‘champions’ and ‘worst students’ are identified and supported with
evidence, for advocacy purposes.
Thus, in the second cycle of the project (2009–2011), the methodology was enhanced
in two tracks: firstly, new research procedures were developed to improve the validity
of results; secondly, the Index underwent empirical fine-tuning through its application
not only in Serbia but in research throughout the Western Balkans. The ‘Index
of SSR’ was shared and tested by six partner think-tanks 217 in the regional component
of the study, which resulted in individual publications on SSR in each of the respective
Western Balkan countries. 218 While in this publication the research findings are
not presented in a comparative manner, standardised methodology was used by the
217 For this purpose, BCSP delivered training sessions during which the Index of SSR and results of
country studies were reviewed. Between training sessions, BCSP and DCAF staff members were in
charge of research coordination and provision of mentorship to participating CSOs.
218 Including a ‘Context Analysis of SSR’ published in each country and this volume.
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