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almanac on security sector oversight in the Western Balkans

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<strong>the</strong> General Staff and also can dismiss him or her. The Chief of <strong>the</strong> General Staff is<br />

resp<strong>on</strong>sible for command of army units and is accountable to <strong>the</strong> president as well as<br />

to <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ister of defence.<br />

Box 1: General Dimov dismissed from office<br />

In 2010, <strong>the</strong> president dismissed General Zoran Dimov after c<strong>on</strong>sultati<strong>on</strong>s with <strong>the</strong><br />

m<strong>in</strong>ister of defence and chief of <strong>the</strong> general staff. The reas<strong>on</strong>s were disobedience of<br />

command and violati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Maced<strong>on</strong>ian Army Code (Alfa TV, 2010).<br />

All legislati<strong>on</strong> approved by parliament needs to be signed by <strong>the</strong> president. This “veto<br />

power” is rarely employed. There have been no cases of legislati<strong>on</strong> related to <strong>the</strong><br />

Armed Forces be<strong>in</strong>g vetoed by <strong>the</strong> president.<br />

136<br />

3.2. Parliament<br />

The Maced<strong>on</strong>ian Parliament has several <strong>oversight</strong> and c<strong>on</strong>trol competencies related<br />

to <strong>the</strong> Armed Forces: vot<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong> PSOs, pass<strong>in</strong>g strategies, declar<strong>in</strong>g war or a state of<br />

emergency, etc. (Law <strong>on</strong> Defence, Article 17) 81 . In practice, <strong>oversight</strong> focuses mostly <strong>on</strong><br />

implementati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> government’s policies. Hav<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d that <strong>the</strong> president of<br />

<strong>the</strong> country is <strong>the</strong> head of <strong>the</strong> Armed Forces, MPs can <strong>in</strong>itiate a procedure for decid<strong>in</strong>g<br />

<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> accountability of <strong>the</strong> president through <strong>the</strong> Maced<strong>on</strong>ian C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al Court.<br />

No such moti<strong>on</strong> has been <strong>in</strong>itiated by parliament so far.<br />

Parliament derives its <strong>oversight</strong> role regard<strong>in</strong>g PSOs from <strong>the</strong> Law <strong>on</strong> Defence, which<br />

authorises MPs to decide to send soldiers abroad (Law <strong>on</strong> Defence, Article 41). The<br />

procedure is as follows: <strong>the</strong> government sends a proposal to parliament (Committee<br />

<strong>on</strong> Defence and Security) <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g different elements such as a legal basis for send<strong>in</strong>g<br />

troops, mandate and f<strong>in</strong>ances aspects. It is up to committee members to discuss <strong>the</strong><br />

proposal, which should <strong>the</strong>n be sent to a plenary sessi<strong>on</strong>. In spite of <strong>the</strong>se powers, MPs<br />

have rarely substantially debated PSOs. For example, discussi<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> advisability of<br />

such missi<strong>on</strong>s or more detailed questi<strong>on</strong>s about <strong>the</strong> nature of missi<strong>on</strong>s (e.g. risk to soldiers<br />

or o<strong>the</strong>r technical questi<strong>on</strong>s), are rarely raised. Nor do MPs substantially debate<br />

<strong>the</strong> proposed missi<strong>on</strong> budgets even though <strong>the</strong>y receive basic f<strong>in</strong>ancial <strong>in</strong>formati<strong>on</strong>.<br />

There are many reas<strong>on</strong>s for this lack of debate. Primarily, as Maced<strong>on</strong>ia progresses<br />

towards <strong>the</strong> EU and NATO, <strong>the</strong>re is a comm<strong>on</strong> belief that c<strong>on</strong>tribut<strong>in</strong>g to PSOs will<br />

streng<strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> bid to jo<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se organisati<strong>on</strong>s. This is easily verified by exam<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />

statistics when committee members vote <strong>on</strong> send<strong>in</strong>g soldiers abroad. In all cases <strong>the</strong><br />

committee has voted <strong>in</strong> favour and with c<strong>on</strong>sensus. Sec<strong>on</strong>dly, given <strong>the</strong> lack of MP<br />

expertise about PSOs, no substantial debate can be expected <strong>on</strong> technical aspects.<br />

81 For more details <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> competences of <strong>the</strong> parliament regard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> defence of <strong>the</strong> country please<br />

also refer to Table 1 of this document.

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