almanac on security sector oversight in the Western Balkans

Montenegro
Finally, the National Security Agency is, according to relevant legislation, the civilian
intelligence and counter-intelligence service designed to protect the national interests
of the country. (Law on National Security Agency (2005), Art.1) The law prescribes that
the National Security Agency is under democratic civilian control.
The present analysis was unable to point out the key issues or debates that have
framed security sector reform and governance in Montenegro. One reason for this
alluded to previously is a highly disinterested public that is reluctant to take an active
role in giving these issues visibility. This could be perceived as the result of broader
contextual factors within which security sector reform in Montenegro has unfolded,
mentioned previously. In addition, the government followed a top down approach
when reforming the security sector and it did not include other actors in discussions
about the reform. Although not essential for security sector reform, the fact that the
government never clearly defined its goals for reform or proposed a coherent action
plan had deleterious results. The government did not specify by which means it
planned to achieve the aims of the reform nor did it provide a cost benefit analysis of
the reform or a prognosis of how long it would last. To put it simply, the country never
made a detailed needs analysis as set out above – “the plan of state reform” (Hadzic,
2009) before embarking on reform. Without a clear plan and guidelines, it was unlikely
for serious debates around the security sector to occur. Notwithstanding the lack
of interest from civil society and insufficient expertise in this area, eventually, all of
these factors meant that Montenegro (including parliament) has never had a serious
debate regarding the structure, pace and costs of security sector reform.
The European and Euro-Atlantic integration process (the aim to become member of
the EU and NATO) and efforts to bring security sector legislation in line with international
standards helped to advance reform. The specific local context of the country,
however, must not be neglected. Unfortunately, in practice, this mistake was made. As
was the case in a number of post-communist countries, Montenegro mostly has adopted
legal standards of Western countries without sufficiently taking into account the
local context and security needs. As a result, these laws are constantly being changed
and amended. This is a serious burden on state resources, both human and material.
For instance, when it comes to the main strategic documents of the state, such as the
National Security Strategy, the desire to fulfil all the necessary conditions in regard to
accession to the NATO Alliance are evident, whereas needs and challenges emanating
from the national context are hardly taken into account. The National Security
Strategy is an important document with the main purpose being to define potential
security challenges, risks and threats. Instead of including challenges that are specific
to Montenegro and the Western Balkan region, however, certain definitions were
simply copied from NATO strategic documents. Regions such as the Middle East and
the Caucasus, which are major NATO priorities but not necessarily Montenegrin priorities,
have been included in the strategy. The National Security Strategy also claims that
organised crime in Montenegro is solely an external threat. This again ignores the domestic
context, because it excludes the possibility that organised crime may originate
and/or be present in the country. This is simply not in accordance with numerous reports
from international and domestic organisations. Also, the European Union, in its
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Almanac on Security Sector Oversight in the Western Balkans