almanac on security sector oversight in the Western Balkans

Serbia
vides (Art. 16) that the Defence and Security Committee (DSC) should “[oversee] the
legality of spending”, the Assembly’s new Rules of Procedure (2010) failed to provide
further elaboration.
Both aforementioned committees of the National Assembly repeatedly missed opportunities
to exercise oversight. The Defence and Security Committee has not discussed
actors’ financial proposals, or any of the other key budget documents; while the Finance
Committee is legally not responsible to analyse and decide upon financial plan
proposals. The fact that funds intended for state security actors comprise a substantial
sixteen per cent of the state budget (RSD 121bn of a total RSD 763 bn) does not seem
to concern parliament.
A parliament staffer informed that the number of parliamentary committee’s support
staff is inadequate, and more importantly, personnel have obtained only modest training
on exercising control over government spending. 174 The National Assembly’s Section
for Information and Research, numbering just five employees, has only been able
to produce one publication entitled “Parliamentary Control over Budget Funds”. 175
This publication only includes basic information on the role parliament should play in
control and oversight and provides some insight into such practices in other countries.
4.1. Public procurement
Many aspects of public procurement in Serbia are imperfect, including the control
and oversight mechanisms. The 2009 Public Procurement Law has been criticised for
containing too many exceptions. 176 The single greatest flaw might be that no external
control body is notified upon completion of procurement, which seriously hampers effective
monitoring. The exceptions begin with small value procurement (procurement
amounting to less than three thousand Euros annually). Confidential procurement is
also excused from the Public Procurement Law and any procurement can be deemed
confidential subjecting it to internal control only. The Public Procurement Office (PPO)
has no authority in the matter. Weapons and protective gear, telecommunications and
ballistic equipment and even transport all may fall under confidential procurement. 177
Since most procurement is handled through open procedures, regular reporting to
the PPO remains the most important control mechanism. Each state security actor is
174 The parliament staffer was interviewed on 10 March 2011 during expert consultations organized
by BCSP in Vrsac, Serbia. For more information, visit http://www.ccmr-bg.org/News/3976/Institutions%9
2+representatives+have+tested+Centre%92s+methodology+of+measuring+progress+in+security+sect
or+reform.shtml (accessed 21November 21 2011).
175 Ibid.
176 For the exceptions in the law see Article 7 on the Principle of Transparency in the Use of Public
Funds. For an assessment of the law, see OECD SIGMA (Support for Improvement in Governance
and Management), 2010, “Assessment Serbia: Public Procurement”, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/47/47075563.pdf
(accessed November 21, 2011): pp.2-3.
177 As provided by three separate regulations: one for MoD and SAF, one for MoI and one for BIA
199
Almanac on Security Sector Oversight in the Western Balkans