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almanac on security sector oversight in the Western Balkans

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The emergence of new actors permanently eroded <strong>the</strong> <strong>security</strong> m<strong>on</strong>opoly and exclusivity<br />

of <strong>the</strong> traditi<strong>on</strong>al <strong>security</strong> forces. Parallel with this, a shift of nati<strong>on</strong>al <strong>security</strong><br />

from <strong>the</strong> high politics doma<strong>in</strong> to <strong>the</strong> public policy doma<strong>in</strong> began. Today, <strong>on</strong>ly parliament<br />

has <strong>the</strong> competencies to def<strong>in</strong>e nati<strong>on</strong>al <strong>security</strong> strategy <strong>in</strong> <strong>Western</strong> Balkan<br />

countries, and executive bodies are obliged to draw up<strong>on</strong> those strategies <strong>in</strong> order<br />

to create and implement <strong>the</strong> current <strong>security</strong> policy. To achieve this, a clear cha<strong>in</strong> of<br />

civilian command was established <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se countries (Annex, Table 5). The l<strong>in</strong>es of<br />

<strong>in</strong>tegrated and coord<strong>in</strong>ated management of <strong>the</strong> state <strong>security</strong> <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s were simultaneously<br />

developed. Professi<strong>on</strong>al aut<strong>on</strong>omy of <strong>the</strong> military, police and <strong>in</strong>telligence<br />

services was formally secured and streng<strong>the</strong>ned. 206 Civilian supremacy <strong>in</strong> governance<br />

was also streng<strong>the</strong>ned, ow<strong>in</strong>g to a gradual <strong>in</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong> of n<strong>on</strong>-uniformed experts <strong>in</strong><br />

relevant m<strong>in</strong>istries. This partly limited <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>fluence of <strong>the</strong> <strong>security</strong> elites’ corporate<br />

<strong>in</strong>terests <strong>on</strong> governance. This is also <strong>the</strong> goal of professi<strong>on</strong>alisati<strong>on</strong> of public adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong>s,<br />

aimed at limit<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>fluence of <strong>the</strong> political class <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> governance of <strong>the</strong><br />

<strong>security</strong> <strong>sector</strong>. It can be justifiably c<strong>on</strong>cluded that executive actors <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong> now<br />

possess all necessary authorities and means for strict c<strong>on</strong>trol of <strong>the</strong> state <strong>security</strong> forces.<br />

It is far more important that this form of c<strong>on</strong>trol, unlike <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>herited authoritarian<br />

model, is now based, at least declaratively, <strong>on</strong> democratic procedures and precepts. All<br />

leaders and executives are bound by law to work transparently and to be available to<br />

<strong>the</strong> public, <strong>in</strong> accordance with legal provisi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>fidentiality.<br />

The ma<strong>in</strong> supporter of democratic governance comes from <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>security</strong> <strong>sector</strong><br />

governance regimes have now become ra<strong>the</strong>r complex, ow<strong>in</strong>g to an <strong>in</strong>creased number<br />

of actors as well as adm<strong>in</strong>istrative and command reforms. The establishment of bodies<br />

and procedures for <strong>in</strong>ternal c<strong>on</strong>trol of each <strong>security</strong> <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> is an additi<strong>on</strong>al check.<br />

Evaluati<strong>on</strong> and assessment of <strong>the</strong> read<strong>in</strong>ess and capacity of <strong>the</strong> units and members of<br />

a given <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> is am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> key competencies of <strong>in</strong>ternal c<strong>on</strong>trol bodies. They are<br />

authorised to c<strong>on</strong>trol <strong>the</strong> legality of <strong>security</strong> forces’ work, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g budget spend<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

In additi<strong>on</strong>, <strong>on</strong>e duty of <strong>in</strong>ternal c<strong>on</strong>trol bodies is to systematically m<strong>on</strong>itor whe<strong>the</strong>r<br />

<strong>the</strong> <strong>security</strong> <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s respect human rights of <strong>the</strong> public and of <strong>the</strong>ir own pers<strong>on</strong>nel.<br />

Managerial and command competencies <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Western</strong> <strong>Balkans</strong> countries are distributed<br />

am<strong>on</strong>g different bodies and <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> executive branch. For example, a<br />

country’s m<strong>in</strong>istry of f<strong>in</strong>ance has an obligati<strong>on</strong> to systematically c<strong>on</strong>trol f<strong>in</strong>ancial management<br />

<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> statutory <strong>security</strong> <strong>sector</strong>. This is additi<strong>on</strong>al proof that systemic dec<strong>on</strong>centrati<strong>on</strong>,<br />

redistributi<strong>on</strong> and restricti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>security</strong> power has been undertaken. This<br />

dangerous power is thus no l<strong>on</strong>ger solely <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> hands of a s<strong>in</strong>gle state leader or rul<strong>in</strong>g<br />

group. Local <strong>security</strong> services can no l<strong>on</strong>ger apply special measures without a court’s<br />

written c<strong>on</strong>sent. It can be safely assumed that <strong>the</strong> danger of arbitrary – external or<br />

<strong>in</strong>ternal – abuse of state <strong>security</strong> forces has been largely removed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>.<br />

In order to prevent a situati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> which all decisi<strong>on</strong>-mak<strong>in</strong>g would depend <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

power and will<strong>in</strong>gness or unwill<strong>in</strong>gness of <strong>the</strong> current adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong>, and <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> ex-<br />

206 It was for this purpose that <strong>the</strong> positi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> director was <strong>in</strong>troduced, who is selected through<br />

open competiti<strong>on</strong>.<br />

224

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