almanac on security sector oversight in the Western Balkans

The formative phase was crucial for later, albeit uneven, developments of SSR in the
region. A radical parting with the old regime was delayed and made more complicated
due to the wars and/or war environment. This is also the reason why the countries
of the Western Balkans spent so much time in the grips of authoritarian regimes
which local authorities tried to make legitimate. 192 It is therefore not suprising that
the processes of initial and/or fake democratisation and SSR often developed on two
separate tracks.
The above-mentioned processes of the 1990s enabled the prolonged survival and mutation
of an ethno-centric authoritarian regime in Serbia (Popović et al., 2011, pp.9-11)
and Montenegro (FRY, SU SaM) (Radević and Raičević, 2011, pp.7-10), and its establishment
in Croatia. 193 In both cases, plebiscite caesarianism was active under a disguise of
democracy, enabling the central state authorities to gain and renew their legitimacy
at regular, but not necessarily fair, elections. For these same reasons, the authoritarian
model of rule is still employed by local ethnic-religious elites in the entities of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, despite its externally installed democratic facade (Hadžović et al.,
2011, pp.9-16). A similar model is applied in Kosovo, where power is still controlled by
elites, a by-product of war (Qehaja and Vrajolli, 2011, pp.12-14). On the other hand,
Albania, under the rule of the Democratic Party and after the ex-communists gathered
in the Socialist party lost the elections in 1992, witnessed the formation of a new type
of authoritarianism. It was accompanied by the strengthening of the political elites’
personal power overstate security forces (Dyrmishi et al., 2011, p.8). At the same time,
in Macedonia, members of the local ethnic Albanian community denied the legitimacy
of the new regime and the state apparatuses of force until the Ohrid Agreement was
signed in 2001. Strong ethnic divisions directly diminished the modest democratic capacities
of the new institutions in Macedonia (Koneska and Kotevska, 2011, pp.7-13).
3 . The emergence and shaping of security institutions
The emergence and shaping of security institutions in the Western Balkan countries
were mostly determined by the collapse of socialism and the wars waged in the region.
In this section I will pinpoint only the factors that were crucial in defining the form,
social and professional profile, and power and position in society of these institutions.
The Western Balkan countries can be divided into two distinct groups according to
their starting positions. The first group includes Croatia, Macedonia and Kosovo, as
they gained their independence during the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia. Their
state security forces were created out of (pre)war necessity, their purpose being to
create new states by armed force and/or protect them. Bosnia and Herzegovina cer-
192 In the countries of Yugoslav origin, new authorities covered themselves with the veil of democracy
primarily to achieve external legitimacy, while internally they legitimised themselves primarily by means
of ethnic-religious and state-building arguments and reasons.
193 See also Knezović and Staničić, 2011, pp.14-16, which describes it as a semi-presidential system with
democratic deficits.
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