almanac on security sector oversight in the Western Balkans

Accountability of Statutory Security Actors in the Western Balkans
(ill)will. 201 This was a cornerstone of their later transformation into a praetorian guard
of the local Leader (Žunec, 1998; Hadžić, 2000). However, the lower down the hierarchical
ladder the units were, the more operational autonomy they had. On a tactical
level, the combat dynamics directly depended on the will of local warlords and their
representatives. These units were fighting and committing crimes together with paramilitary
formations. This was the root of what was later to become a large-scale and
cross-border criminalisation of wars in the former Yugoslavia.
The externally enforced end of the wars in the former Yugoslavia required the countries
who participated in them to return their military, police and intelligence services
to peacetime conditions. Demilitarisation, demobilisation, decriminalisation and
depoliticisation became top priorities on the agenda. These processes could not be
carried out successfully without the return of local society from wartime to peacetime
conditions. Despite this, the heritage of war remained an important intervening factor
for a long period of time. In each country it had a different meaning and it affected
differently the scope and content of reform of inherited security institutions.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the processes were undertaken, but not finalised, with
participation and under the auspices of NATO and various representatives of the UN,
EU and the OSCE. Conversely, in Croatia and FRY, the reconfiguration of the security
sector was carried out autonomously, until the death of Franjo Tuđman in 1999 and
the toppling of Slobodan Milošević in the 2000 elections. An important similarity between
the two states was reflected in the fact that a caesarian involution of the authoritarian
regime occured in both countries after operation “Storm“ in Croatia and
the signing of the Dayton Agreement. On the other hand, a key difference resulted
from the fact that Croatia emerged as a winner and FRY as a loser after the war.
Croatian armed and security forces gained considerable power and reputation during
the war, which gave them priority in the distribution of power and benefits after
the war. Their contribution in the war and loyalty to Tuđman spared them from any
changes, especially from radical ones. Moreover, the image of patriotic warriors and
state-builders protected them from any accountability for war crimes. Consequently,
after Tuđman’s death, the security elites and right-wing political parties represented
the biggest obstacle to radical SSR. They represented a political threat to any successor
of Tuđman’s, particularly if he would dare to radically change their status and/or
limit their power.
On the other hand, Slobodan Milošević greatly profited, though temporarily, from
the deafeat of his war policy. During the war, he put all existing state security forces
under his total control and authority. After the war, he secured their loyalty by
protecting them from accountability for defeat, and by putting their wartime criminal
files safely under lock and key. This was the main reason why security elites,
together with right-wing political parties, became not only the main obstacle to
201 From the military point of view, and in the example of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA, ARS), this is illustrated
by the unjustified blockade and devastation of Vukovar, the bombing of Dubrovnik, and the siege
of Sarajevo that lasted several years, as well as by the later involvement of the JNA in the war against NATO.
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Almanac on Security Sector Oversight in the Western Balkans