almanac on security sector oversight in the Western Balkans

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Table 4: Competences of executive authorities over the intelligence services 34 State Intelligence Service Military Intelligence Service President • Appoints the Director and the Deputy Director • Dismisses the Director and the Deputy Director Prime Minister • Proposes legislation to the parliament • Proposes the budget to the parliament • Approves organisation structure and human resources • Sets policy guidelines • Defines international cooperation • Nominates the Director and the Deputy Director • Appoints the Inspector General • Authorises use of special funds • Initiates financial inspections • Proposes legislation to the parliament • Proposes the budget to the parliament • Appoints the Director • Approves organisation structure and human resources Minister of Defence • Proposes legislation to the Council of Ministers • Proposes the budget to the Council of Ministers • Sets policy guidelines • Defines international cooperation • Nominates the Director and the Deputy Director • Reports once a year to the president and the prime minister In order to insulate the SIS from the political processes, it has been placed outside of government and functions as an autonomous agency. This is ensured through shared responsibilities of the prime minister and president in appointing the SIS director as well as in the dual reporting line. Further, the law obliges the SIS to report directly to parliament with no prior clearance of the report by the prime minister or president. In the long term, this mechanism has contributed to preserving the SIS from further politicisation, but it has had some negative effects. Firstly, it has negatively influenced relations between the prime minister and president since the latter has the final say on the appointment and dismissal of the directors of SIS. 29 Secondly, given the prime minister and government are the main recipients of intelligence, such relations have negatively influenced SIS performance. The closeness of the SIS to the president is not beneficial to the system as the president has very limited competences for using 29 All four Albanian prime ministers who have served since 1997 have requested the dismissal of the Director of the SIS on several occasions in different moments during their term. In all but one occasion their requests have been turned down by the presidents (even though in some cases the presidents came from the same political party as the prime ministers).
Albania intelligence, while the National Security Council is dysfunctional and does not play a substantial role in intelligence (Dyrmishi, 2009). Thirdly, it has encouraged the prime minister and government to empower military intelligence to circumvent the SIS. Unlike the SIS, the MIS is administratively placed within the Ministry of Defence and the Minister of Defence and prime minister have direct responsibility for its control. This position allows closer government control. 6.3. Parliamentary control and oversight Albania has a constitutional, legal and institutional framework allowing parliament to control and oversee intelligence services. Analysis of the legal framework and the practice, however, reveals a fragmented picture concerning (1) completeness of legislation, (2) implementation and (3) resources and institutional capacities: (1) The legal framework includes ex ante and ex post procedures and mechanisms for control of intelligence services by parliament. Ex ante control is performed through adoption of legislation and the budget of intelligence services and ex post oversight is performed through control of implementation of laws and budgetary spending. The Albanian Constitution provides that laws and budgets are approved by parliament, and indeed such procedure has never been breached. For the ex post oversight too, the constitution lays down provisions for the executive branch to be held accountable to parliament on the implementation of laws and budgets. The legislation on intelligence services lays down provisions for this. Both the Law on the State Intelligence Service and the Law on the Military Intelligence Service lay down the obligation of the Director of SIS and the Minister of Defence to report to parliament at least annually (Law on Military Intelligence Service 2003, Art.18 and Law on State Intelligence Service 1998, Art.7). Except for this clause on yearly reporting, however, the laws lack provisions to regulate interaction of parliament with intelligence services in case parliament needs to further investigate. In order to address this problem, the CNS has proposed a law, 30 but it has been pending for nearly two years and the initiative was not pursued by parliament. 31 (2) By formally adopting laws and budgets, parliament controls equally the SIS and the MIS. Laws and budgets are scrutinised by the permanent committees and debated in plenary session. Parliament’s input and its ability to shape legislation, however, has been weak and the executive’s proposals are adopted with very little modification. 30 OSCE Presence Recommendations on Bill on Parliamentary Oversight of Intelligence and Security Services, Accessed March 2011, http://www.osce.org/sq/albania/71375. 31 The draft law proposed the establishment of the intelligence committee with the mandate to oversee: a) the lawfulness (and proportionality) of the activities, whether or not agreed procedures are followed (investigation of complaints by individuals may be included), verify that proper democratic control is exercised by the executive and that individual human rights are not unlawfully breached; b) the proper use and accounting of financial resources; c) investigate how the intelligence is collected, used and protected, thus acting as a mechanism to either reassure the wider population or to investigate shortcoming or abuses; d) make recommendations about the effectiveness, priorities and remit of the services and the discharge of democratic control by the government over the services. 35 Almanac on Security Sector Oversight in the Western Balkans
Page 1 and 2: Serbia Almanac on Security Sector O
Page 4 and 5: Publishers: the Belgrade Centre for
Page 6 and 7: Acknowledgements This alman
Page 8 and 9: Introduction While official coopera
Page 10 and 11: the purpose of this study, accounta
Page 12 and 13: Different authors chose to present
Page 15 and 16: Chapter 1 - Albania Authors: Arjan
Page 17 and 18: 1 . Introduction Albania This chapt
Page 19 and 20: Albania cotts them. Opposition ofte
Page 21 and 22: Table 2: Permanent committees with
Page 23 and 24: Albania The president is also the h
Page 25 and 26: Albania trust the expertise of the
Page 27 and 28: Box 1: The Gerdec case Albania The
Page 29 and 30: Albania Executive financial control
Page 31 and 32: Albania resources of the People´s
Page 33: Albania become a common trend (Free
Page 37 and 38: Albania these units are not always
Page 39 and 40: Albania Trust has increased in the
Page 41 and 42: Albania • The executive and parli
Page 43 and 44: Albania 26. Minutes from the discus
Page 45: Albania 11. OECD. SIGMA, Support fo
Page 48 and 49: Abbreviations and acronyms BiH Bosn
Page 50 and 51: that with its assistance, in the fo
Page 52 and 53: fourteen police agencies in Bosnia
Page 54 and 55: An institution that best exemplifie
Page 56 and 57: Several different agencies share co
Page 58 and 59: this research, these departments ad
Page 60 and 61: the respect for human rights in the
Page 62 and 63: significantly improved since 2008,
Page 64 and 65: 2006, Bosnia and Herzegovina signed
Page 66 and 67: 5 . Recommendations The proposed la
Page 68 and 69: Bibliography 68 Primary sources 1.
Page 70: 8. www.sipa.gov.ba - state Investig
Page 74 and 75: Abbreviations and acronyms BiH Bosn
Page 76 and 77: 1 . Introduction This chapter will
Page 78 and 79: new dynamics to both, internal and
Page 80 and 81: social groups and institutions as a
Page 82 and 83: Figure 1 International organization
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higher standards of operations of s
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There are numerous ways in which pa
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norms result from overzealous attem
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esources is a fact of life in all t
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5.1.2. Lessons learned from impleme
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Social Democratic government marked
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Reform deteriorated in the next per
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Bibliography 53 1. Anderson, Peter
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38. Zakon o prekršajima, Narodne n
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Abbreviations and acronyms ACA Koso
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1 . Introduction The security secto
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The international military presence
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Figure 1: Organisation of the Secur
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Figure 2: Mapping of the Security S
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According to the new Law on the Pol
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Hearings for budgetary proposals ar
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Court decisions for criminal cases
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human rights by the Kosovo Assembly
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Both the OAG and the ACA submit the
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context, therefore, is a crucial in
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Bibliography 126 Legislation 1. Con
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Chapter 5 - Macedonia Author: Andre
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1 . Introduction Macedonia Macedoni
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Macedonia through assistance to and
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Macedonia Oversight institutions ha
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Macedonia Thirdly, the Committee on
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Macedonia Even though the SAO issue
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4.1. Parliament Macedonia The polic
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Macedonia SICPS is unprofessional a
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4.5. Constitutional Court Macedonia
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Macedonia Members of the Committee
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Macedonia person under surveillance
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Macedonia should be expanded by con
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Macedonia 14. Закон за ра
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Macedonia 32. State Audit Office (2
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Chapter 6 - Montenegro Authors: Raj
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1 . Introduction Montenegro The aim
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Montenegro The process of security
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Montenegro Finally, the National Se
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Montenegro CSD only needs the agree
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Montenegro bers representing differ
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Montenegro only after the Agency fo
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3.5. Financial oversight and contro
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Montenegro make additional efforts
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Bibliography Legislation Montenegro
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Montenegro 13. Ministry of Internal
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Abbreviations and acronyms CCD Code
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herent. The reason for this was a l
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ance and respect for human rights a
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security institutions during one wo
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meetings, regular exchange of infor
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maltreatment in custody it is impos
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expressed in relation to the role o
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have acted as intermediaries of the
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and the third, budgetary inspection
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obliged to send quarterly reports o
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The aforementioned problems could b
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6.1.3. Judiciary • Courts should
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Bibliography 206 Primary sources 1.
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208 Secondary sources 1. Belgrade C
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210
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Abbreviations and acronyms ARS Army
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ise data from previous analyses 186
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states and in the region (Hadžić,
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The formative phase was crucial for
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similarities between the processes
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adical SSR, but also the main threa
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The emergence of new actors permane
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control and oversee the work of exe
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MPs in the work of several committe
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Table 3: New legal framework Laws A
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Table 4 - part 2: Political and Str
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Table 7: Independent State Institut
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14. Miroslav Hadžić, Milorad Timo
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SSR Index - Measuring to Advance De
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1 . Introduction SSR Index - Measur
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Box 1: Where is this framework appl
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• Frequency: frequent/occasional/
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Annex I: Grading System for SSR GRA
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GRADE 5 Focus is on adopted values
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Grades Grades for Parliamentary Con
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Albania Grades Table: Measuring Thr
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Albania Bosnia and Herzegovina tran
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Bosnia and Herzegovina reveals defi
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Bosnia and Herzegovina Croatia esta
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Croatia Grades GENERAL TRANSPARENCY
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Croatia contribute to the planning
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Kosovo Grades GENERAL TRANSPARENCY
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Kosovo Macedonia Procurement transp
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Macedonia Grades GENERAL TRANSPAREN
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Macedonia The state budget is based
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Montenegro Recommendations: • The
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Montenegro of Public Procurement, t
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Serbia ties of the DSC’s work, cl
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Serbia of the actors’ organizatio
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Research Consortium Partners ANALYT
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