almanac on security sector oversight in the Western Balkans

Montenegro
bers representing different institutions: the BAR Association, the Medical Chamber,
academia, the Association of Lawyers and a representative of civil society representatives.
The decisions (recommendations) adopted by the Council for Civic Control of
Police Work are sent to the police director, with the intent that he act upon them. If
the Council for Civic Control of Police Work is not satisfied with the action taken by
the police director, it can inform the public and notify parliament. So far members of
the Council for Civic Control of Police Work have been very active in performing their
role. In the period from 2005 to 2008, the council addressed more than one hundred
fifty cases (Council for Civic Control of Police, 2008). It was present in the media, and
therefore had a certain outreach in public. Even though the Committee on Security
and Defence has the possibility to involve the council members in its working sessions,
this has not been the practice so far. Connecting the two institutions would most likely
bring about positive synergy and much more accountability to the sector. Put simply,
better coordination and cooperation should be the aim of these institutions in the
future.
The two institutions which are by law obliged to interact with parliament through
the submission of regular reports (at least once a year) are the Ombudsman and the
State Audit Institution. Like similar bodies in most Western Balkan countries they do
not have a mandate directly referring to security sector actors. This is not problematic
since their provisions encompass the entire public administration. These institutions
could perform more efficiently and with greater results. Their activity is limited to presenting
a yearly report or to pointing out single incidents of malpractice. So far they
have failed to make additional efforts and to monitor continuously the executive’s
follow up to their recommendations. One possible reason for this could be inadequate
financial compensation and not enough working space (particularly in the case of the
Ombudsman). Indeed, underfunding and denying office space should be considered
political interference, in the sense that politicians may be denying these bodies the
means needed to perform their duties. Finally, one must not discount the possible
political interference in the election of the Ombudsman and the possible negative
effect on its work this might have. In its 2010 progress report, the EC stated that the
independence of the Ombudsman could raise concerns, as he/she is elected by a simple
majority of parliament.
The role of the State Audit Institution (SAI) is important in the chain of independent
oversight. The SAI exercises constitutional authority over the financial operations of
the state. Its portfolio covers all legal entities in which the state has a financial interest.
The State Audit Institution determines independently which entities it will audit,
the timing and scope of the audits, and how the audits will be conducted. In several
cases security providers have been the subject of separate audit revisions by the State
Audit Institution. Nevertheless, the main issue of concern regarding the SAI’s work
remains that government and ministries follow the State Audit Institution recommendations
very late or they do not implement them at all (Mirjacic, 2011).
The need to pay special attention to further enhancing the role of the Ombudsman
and the SAI was stressed in last year’s European Commission progress report (see
Box 2).
169
Almanac on Security Sector Oversight in the Western Balkans