almanac on security sector oversight in the Western Balkans

Accountability of Statutory Security Actors in the Western Balkans
wave of changes swept across Macedonia in 2001, giving rise to ethnic and religious
consequences of the wars in the former Yugoslavia. However, the beginning of ethnic
armed conflicts was prevented in Macedonia at an early stage by foreign intervention,
and then frozen (Koneska and Kotevska, 2011, pp.5-6, 17).
Unlike the former Yugoslav countries, the consequences of the collapse of socialism in
Albania were felt as late as 1997. After the collapse of the regime, the country faced
a real threat of civil war. The effects of the wars in the former Yugoslavia, along with
the collapse of the Albanian state, facilitated the irreversible penetration of the EU,
NATO, and the United States into the Western Balkans. Ever since, a Euro-Atlantic
overlay has been spread in the region.
The contexts, pace, content and scope of SSR processes in the Western Balkan countries
were, and still are, marked by three crucial similarities. The first similarity is the
result of the participation of five countries in the region – Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia 190 - in the wars waged on ex-Yugoslav territory,
and the direct exposure of the two remaining countries – Albania and Macedonia – to
their consequences. The second similarity results from the fact that three new states
– Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Kosovo– and their security institutions were
created and shaped under the conditions of a massive, internal and/or external use
of armed force. The state and its security forces were created in Macedonia, directly
transformed in Serbia and Montenegro 191 , and indirectly transformed in Albania under
the influence of the immediate war environment (Dyrmishi et al., 2011, pp.7-11).
The first two similarities led to the third important similarity of SSR contexts. Due to
wars and/or internal conflicts, the irreversible parting of the Western Balkan countries
with socialism was first prevented and/or delayed, and then considerably slowed
down and made difficult on many levels. The absence of internal consensus on the
needs, goals, manner and pace of the dissolution of the old regime contributed to this
situation. During the 1990s, the economic and social price of post-socialist transition
in these countries – including the costs of the establishment and transformation of the
military, police and intelligence services – became enormously high. At the same time,
the willingness of local populations to pay this price was progressively diminishing.
The price became even higher when it included costs of war damages, and this was
ultimately far more than the populations of the states in the region were able to pay.
The growing number of transition losers, together with the costs of war, generated
strong internal threats to personal and collective safety. This partly explains why state
authorities were extremely cautious in reorganising and/or reforming the (inherited)
military, police and intelligence services.
190 We will set aside the debate on perpetrators of the wars waged on the territory of former Yugoslavia,
i.e. on agressors and victims. We included Serbia and Montenegro in this group as they, contrary
to the claims of their former and current authorities, did participate in these wars from April 1992
onwards, first within SFRY and later in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1992-2003).
191 Starting in 1992 they were members of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and from 2003
until 2006 of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (SU SaM).
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Almanac on Security Sector Oversight in the Western Balkans