almanac on security sector oversight in the Western Balkans

Macedonia
person under surveillance is not necessarily aware of their usage. Lack of cooperation
has led to thorny relations. Even though recognised in the constitution and laws, the
oversight mandate of the Ombudsman regarding intelligence services cannot be thoroughly
practiced because of distrust existing among parties. “Even if the intelligence
services open their doors and allow us to go through their work, the data that we will
receive will be cosmetic and not necessarily reflect the reality.”(Pirovska, 2011)
In the past decade, cases have surfaced indicating human rights abuses such as illegal
wiretapping (Utrinski Vesnik, 2007), detention of suspects in police stations by
DSCI personnel without these being necessarily recorded (Geteva, 2010) or even cases
which suggest the existence of secret detention facilities (European Committee for the
Prevention of Torture, 2008). The Ombudsman did not witness such practices during
the visits in police stations. Still, considering that all the visits in 2010 were previously
announced to MoI employees, these findings cast doubt on the overall process. The
increased powers of the Ombudsman through the National Preventive Mechanism
include conducting visits to secret detention facilities. However, so far there have been
no such visits. This is due to a lack of concrete indications that such practices might
exist, according to the Ombudsman’s spokesperson (Pirovska, 2011). Overall, the Ombudsman’s
office seems sceptical about its involvement in overseeing the work of the
intelligence services through prevention activities.
5.5. Constitutional Court
The Constitutional Court has struck down only two provisions from the Law on the
Intelligence Agency. Both involved employment opportunities and equal access.
6 . Conclusions
The many reforms that were introduced in the past 20 years have, without a doubt,
greatly contributed to the progressive outlook of the security sector today, especially
seen from the perspective of democratic and civilian governance. The process of
normative and institutional set-up is almost finished, with a need for certain modifications
(e.g. the outdated law on the Intelligence Agency). Commitment to EU and
NATO membership brings security sector governance to the spotlight since democratic
governance is a precondition for membership.
Most of the problematic issues raised in this chapter are systemic, meaning they are
embedded and have a long tradition in the system regardless of the political party in
power. The main reasons for some of the setbacks that could be observed in the overall
performance of the institutions overseeing the work of the security sector:
• Lack of political will among parliamentarians and independent state institutions to
conduct substantial oversight leaves a great possibility that the principle of good
governance continues to be impeded in sensitive areas such as misuse of finances,
excessive force, human rights infringements, etc.
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Almanac on Security Sector Oversight in the Western Balkans