almanac on security sector oversight in the Western Balkans

similarities between the processes of (re)shaping the security institutions in Serbia and
Montenegro (FRY), Croatia (Edmunds, 2007), Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, just
as the non-participation of Macedonia and Albania in the wars brought about similarities
in those two countries. While Macedonia, in the early years of its independence,
was trying to create and equip new and/or different security institutions, Albania was
struggling to prevent the disintegration of inherited institutions and transform them
to suit the needs of a proclaimed democratic political system.
It should be noted that in the former Yugoslavia the sides in conflict saw the war
as an opportunity – always imposed by the other side – for settling historical debts
between the nations that constituted Yugoslavia, creating ethnic states and a final demarcation
from Others. It is therefore not surprising that all others – the neighbouring
Yugoslav nations and their next-door neighbours – became central objects of overall
securitisation. New security institutions were created and/or shaped to fit the newly
designed states. Their members were socialised, under the disguise of patriotism and
a xenophobic-chauvenistic code, with combat morale to fit the disguise.
The result was ethnic cleansing of the inherited military, police and security services
in the FRY, while ethnically clean security formations were created for the purposes
of the new state in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. Their operations
during the war were in both cases legitimised by the necessity of armed combat to
protect the survival of their nations and states. Protection of the state was good cover
for national leaders to gain absolute power during the war. Furthermore, it acquitted
both them and their security forces of any accountability and protected them from
any form of control and oversight. This led to national laws on the military, police and
intelligence services containing a number of provisions guaranteeing many discretionary
powers to top state officials. 199
Moreover, the unwritten rule of the war was that the ends justified all means. The
(pre)war network of interests among local political, security and criminal elites was
strengthened. This gave way to blatant violations of human rights, culminating in
war crimes committed by various formations of all sides. Numerous para-military and
para-police units were formed in each country from, or with the support of, its regular
forces. On the other hand, units of regular state security forces were gradually sprouting
from various para-formations. 200
Nonetheless, on the strategic level, these states had a strong chain of civilian command
during the war, and local military, police and intelligence services were directly
subordinated to the chief commander. They lost their professional autonomy during
combat and merely became the executors of the chief commander’s political and war
199 For instance, the laws on the military and defence in the FRY were adopted 18 months after the
state had been established.
200 For example, during the war, and under the auspices of the State Security Agency (SSA), the notorious
Special Operations Unit (SOU) of the MoI was created out of the para-military formations that used
to spread havoc in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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