almanac on security sector oversight in the Western Balkans

Box 1: Impression of the Debate
“The Montenegrin Parliament has never had a discussion in plenum on the issue of
overall security in the country; this initiative has always been blocked by the majority
in PCSD”. Interview with member of the Parliament of Montenegro; Podgorica;
February 2011.
Our analysis has identified serious gaps in the oversight of the CSD. So far, it has never
controlled the security institutions’ budget planning or spending (Member of Parliament,
2011). This committee has failed on several occasions to seriously consider or
react to reports of the State Audit Institution on malpractices in discharge of the
budget of the relevant ministries (State Audit Institution, 2007). Indeed, the legal
framework for parliamentary oversight is now sound but practice has yet to catch up
in terms of the committee using its powers and authority effectively. There have been
positive examples, however, of smaller political parties trying to take action. This was
the case when the Social Democratic Party of Montenegro (SDP) (a smaller coalition
partner) initiated the first ever visit to the National Security Agency (NSA) with the
aim of controlling the use of special investigative measures by the Agency. Their influence,
however, is limited and does not guarantee the complete and effective oversight
of security institutions.
Research also revealed that parliamentary committees have only limited administrative
support at their disposal. The CSD employs only one advisor and receives support
from the parliament secretariat. This is not sufficient to guarantee the proper functioning
of this committee. Furthermore, the members of parliament are members of
several committees at the same time which prevents them from focusing solely on the
work in the Parliamentary Committee for Security and Defence. In addition, the public
trust in parliament is low (CEDEM 2002–2011). Low public trust likely stems from
multiple sources. Inadequate oversight of the security sector could be just one source
along with weak administrative support and overstretched committee members.
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3.2. Control and oversight by independent state institutions
Parliament has established several independent institutions which report to it. A review
of the relevant legislation revealed that the legal framework is in place for the
functioning of these specific institutions. In addition, Montenegro has established
mechanisms which are unique in the region, such as the Council for Civic Control of
Police Work.
The Council for Civic Control of Police Work has competences over the civil oversight
of police work, the controlling and monitoring of application of police competences,
protection of human rights and freedoms of citizens, the implementation of the Montenegrin
Law on Police in 2005 and other relevant domestic legal documents. It can
discuss complaints from citizens or police officers and initiate its own investigations.
This body is a unique blend, established by parliament but composed of the members
of civil society. The Council for Civic Control of Police Work is comprised of five mem-